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A DISCOVRSE, CONCERNING INFALLIBILITY IN RELIGION.

WRITTEN BY A PERSON OF QVALITY, TO AN EMINENT LORD.

F. S. L. A.

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A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

—Nihil dulcius est, bonè quàm munita tenere,
Edita doctrinâ sapientum templa serena:
Despicere unde queas alios, passimque videre
Errare, atque viam palantes quærere vitæ.

LVCRET.

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MY LORD,

I come now to pay your lordship the debt I haue owed you euer ſince our long diſcourſe in one of the ſide Chappels of S. Germanes church; when we ſpent moſt part of the afternoone in examining and weighing, which of the ſeuerall Religions that att preſent haue courſe in the world, a prudent man should rationally venture his ſoule vpon. It ſeemed to me that it was not a ſmall ſteppe I had aduanced in obtaining your aſſent to the Catholike, when your lordship acknowledged great defects of ſeuerall kindes, in all others; and that ours, was adorned with more comelineſſe and Maieſty, was maintained with more orderlyneſſe and prudence, was propped with more powerfull meanes to

preſerue vnity among the profeſſors, and in the generall courſe of it was replenished with more efficacious motiues to incite men to the loue of God, then any of the others. But withall, you profeſſed that there were ſome particulars of ſo harddigeſtion in it, as you could notwinne of your ſelfe to yield your aſſent vnto them; Nor were perſuaded that the authority from whence we receiue our faith was infallible, but that in all thoſe particulars it had varyed and ſwarued from what in the beginning was taught by Chriſt and had bin preached throughout the world by his Apoſtles. What I replyed hereunto, ſeemed to your lordship out of the ordinary tracke of thoſe who now adayes vſe to handle controuerſies. And it is but iuſt, that to ſo ſublime a witt as yours is, arguments of a higher ſtraine should be offered then ſuch as are preſſed to vulgar capacities. For as the ordinary ſort of mankinde, haue their vnder-

ſtanding ſatisfyed with barely looking vpon God in quality of a Iudge, that punisheth or rewardeth according as men haue obeyed or tranſgreſſed his lawes: ſo is the enquiry of what they are to do or beleeue, at an end, when thoſe vnto whoſe conduct Gods prouidence hath committed them, do pronounce his decrees to them in a legiſlatiue way. But ſo piercing a iudgement as yours that knoweth there is an orderly and naturall connexion betweene all cauſes and their effects, and that ſuſpecteth not God Almighty of hauing bound mankinde to a meere arbitrary lawfor thebare shewing of his authority and the exerciſing of their obedience; will not be appayed, without hauing ſome ſcantling of the *Why*; aſwell as of the *What*, you are to do and to beleeue. Should we therefore apprehend their lott to be the worſe, that are endowed with the eminenteſt talents; ſince ſo much labor and paines is neceſſary to the quie-

ting of their doubts; when as ſimple people acquieſce ſo eaſily to what they are plainely taught? Nothing leſſe. For though it is true, the difficulty be great in ouercoming their ſtrong reſiſtance: yet, that once done, the vigorous progreſſe they afterwardes make, recompenſeth to the full the precedent paines in wreſtling with their reluctant imaginations and their oppoſing reaſons. Whereas new ſtormes are eaſily raiſed by any croſſe wind that ſhall blow vpon the others flexible nature. S. Auguſtines long irreſoluteneſſe, his anxious ſeeking of truth, and his difficult rendring him ſelfe vnto it, was followed and crowned with admirable perfection in his owne particular, and with vnſpeakable aduantages to the Church of God in generall: ſo as he is the onely ſaint in heauen after S. Paul, that hath the day of his conuerſion celebrated in the Church. Hence is it that I am not one of thoſe who wonder that your lordship is ſo long

before you come into the fould that encloſeth and ſecureth vs. You were not whom I take you to be, if you should yield vp your weapons before you were fully conuinced; or be conuinced before you haue ſearched into the bottome of the queſtion. To putt you into the way of receiuing an entire happy defeate in this conflict, I tooke the freedome to repreſent vnto you ſuch conſiderations as had bin heretofore moſt preualent with me, when I had great vnquietneſſe in beleeuing what I was taught till my reaſon was conuinced that I should do vnreaſonably if I gaue not my aſſent thereunto. Not that I am ſo vaine as to thinke that my proper poore ſtocke can furnish ought that you already abound not more plentifully with. But it hath bin my good fortune; (that is to ſay, Gods Grace hath bin ſo mercifull to me;) that I haue mett with a knowing and iudicious guide, to leade me through this darke and intri-

cate labyrinth. What I had formerly deriued from him for my owne ſatisfaction in this matter, I tendered to you for yours. And wherein I fell short, by deliuering you but a lame coppy (according to my meane skill) of ſo excellent an originall, I referred you either to his learned writinges or to his fuller conuerſation. For your lordship knoweth, he beareth you ſo great reſpect, that vpon any leaſt intimation from you, he would purpoſely make a iorney to you from any remote place to do you ſeruice. In the meane time, I endeauoured to take a ſuruay as well as I could of the whole race that Man runneth; from the firſt moment of his being produced a reaſonnable creature, to the laſt periode of his iorney, when he is ſettled for euer in a ſtate of permanency. For in ſuch a ſubiect, the ſymmetry of the whole, and the due cohœrence of the partes, are of great weight with prudent and ſolide men. This can

not be completely nor orderly done, without firſt ſettling firmely the fundamentall principle, That Mans ſoule is immortall and incorruptible, and ſuruiueth æternally after the death of te body. In the next place, I applyed my ſelfe to shew, how the different courſes of liuing in this world, do begett in the future, different conditions of happineſſe or miſery, each of them exceeding, beyond all conceiuable proportion, the goods or euils of this life. Then, vpon conſideration of the difficulty, or rather impoſſibility, for mankinde to arriue to the aſſured knowledge of thoſe pathes which are neceſſary for him to walke in to bring him to Beatitude, that ſo his ſteppes might be ſteady and bold ones; I concluded, that ſince God would have dealed more hardly with mankinde then with all other creatures beſides, if to euery one of them he had aſſigned due and proportionable meanes to bring them to the vtmoſt periode of their

nature, and should haue left onely him in the darke among ineuitable precipes; It was certaine he had bequeathed to him a ſcience or art whereby to gouerne himſelfe and ſteere his courſe ſo as to be able to arriue ſafely into his wished hauen, and to that end which he was created for. And laſtly, I vrged, that ſince the men who liue in ages after his who taught them this ſcience (which we call Religion) can not be conceiued to receiue it immediatly from his mouth; They would fall backe to an incertitude and diſtreſſed condition equall to the former, if he had not ſettled as infallible a meanes to conuey entirely to them this ſcience, as in it ſelfe it is an infallible guide to bring them to Beatitude. And thence I proceeded to eſtablish that rule wich keepeth vs Catholikes in vnity among our ſelues, and in ſecurity that wee are in the right way.

This was the ſcope of our conference then: which compriſing ſo

many, ſo weighty, and ſo difficult pointes, that a few houres conuerſation was too ſcanty a time to diſcuſſe them as they ought ro be; I promiſed to giue your lordship in writing a ſummary collection of ſome of the moſt important reflections I had made vpon them. The doing whereof, is the ſubiect of the following diſcourſe.

THE FIRST CHAPTER

Of miſtaken demonſtrations.

IN this courſe that I haue propoſed to my ſelfe, my firſt endeauour muſt be to prooue, that the ſoule of man is immortall; neither dying when the body dyeth; nor being liable to corruption or deſtruction after it is ſeuered from the body, either through defectible principles in it ſelfe, or by the violence of any outward agent working vpon it. I conceiue I haue fully performed this in a former treatiſe, that I haue written vpon this

ſubiect. But I may reſonably apprehend that the length of that, and the heape of various arguments cumulated there one vpon another, may not obtaine from a perſon ſo full of great employments as your lordship is, that diſcuſſion which belongeth to euery one of them in particular, to be ſecure of the conſequence drawne out of them; which requireth greater leiſure, then your actiue and ſolicitous charges do allow you: And therefore I will here ſelect ſome few of the chiefe of thoſe which that treatiſe aboundeth with; And will endeauour to make them as plaine as I can, that the diſcerning of the demonſtration which I conceiue is contained in them, may not oblige you to labouring meditation, and Metaphyſicall abſtractions (in which no man can fly with a ſtronger wing then you, when your leiſure can allow you the time and quiett of minde that is neceſſary for ſuch entertainements) But may be ob-

uious to you vpon ſuch preſent reflection as the multitude of your preſent affaires can afford you. My ayme, and hope, is to prooue this truth fully and euidently: That is to ſay, to make a firme demonſtration of it; againſt which no ſolide oppoſition can be produced to weaken it; and by which a iuditious and ſubtile vnderſtanding shall be fully appayed and quieted. To know when that is done, it will not be amiſſe (before we enter into the ſubſtance of the queſtion) to conſider in short, the nature of a true demonſtration; that ſo we may be ſure not to be deceiued by ſeeming proofes: which how many or how plauſible ſoeuer, can but perſuade opinion; neuer force aſſurance.

Some there haue beene, who haue thought that a multitude of reaſons, may haue the force to proue and conuince that, which no one of them ſingle, can reach to do. As particularly in our preſent caſe; they produce for the ſoules

immortality, numerous teſtimonies of great men, both ſuch as haue beene eminent in naturall knowledge, and ſuch as are eſtmed for ſupernaturall illuminations; and to theſe, they adde their owne morall and naturall conſiderations: for example; that, ſince it can not be doubted but that God is both wiſe and iuſt, and conſequently will reward or punish euery man according as he hath deſerued or demerited; and yet we ſee that ſuch lottes do not alwayes betyde men in this life; It followeth, that there muſt be an other life after this here, wherein men shall reape the harueſt they haue ſowne vpon the earth. Againe; That, ſeing all creatures who haue ſoules do moue themſelues; and that no inanimate creature, can do ſo; It followeth, that the ſoule is the vertue and principle by which an animal is mooued. But if the ſoule can make an other thing mooue it ſelfe, it cannot be doubted but that she

hath in her ſelfe the power of mouing her owne ſelfe. Now, life conſiſting in a thing's mouing it ſelfe, it is cleare that what can do ſo, hath within it ſelfe wihout the helpe of ought elſe, a principle of liuing; and conſequently is not ſubiect to dying. Afterall theſe, and many more ſuche plauſible arguments, they conclude, that howbeit neuer a one of them alone can be accounted a demonſtration, yet all of them in bulke haue the ſtrength to conuince and quiett a rationall man. I wil not here examine what force they may haue ouer the vnderſtanding of a morall prudent perſon, who in debates before him vſeth to inquire no further then whether ſide is the more grauely and the more learnedly diſputed: Bnt moſt certaine it is, that if they come before a ſubtile Metaphyſitian or a cunning Logitian, they will fall mainely short. For when ſuch a one shall haue rigorouſly diſcuſſed each particular ar-

gument, and shall haue found euery one of them to be deficient in ſome regard or other; he will conclude, that no more then many nothinges can euer be multiplyed ſo as to make ſomething; no otherwiſe can neuer ſo many apparent proofes (which being but ſuch, are in truth no proofes) euer arriue to conſtitute one reall proofe.

Others there are, who fixing themſelues vpon ſome one argument, do not conſider in it the materiall nature of it; That is to ſay, what connexion the medium on which they build their proofe, hath with the effect or propoſition that they conclude out of it: but onely, whither their argument be difficult to be ſolued, or no. As for example; a perſon of great eminency and reputation for learning, did vſe to putt the following argument to proue that it was poſſible for Infinite to haue an actuall and reall being: Namely. There is no inconuenience that God almighty should pro-

produce att one inſtant as many Angels as he can produce in that inſtant. Suppoſe then that he doth ſo. Whichif he do, themultitude of them wil be greater then any determinate number whatſoeuer ; and conſequently, that multitude will be infinite. Therefore an infinite multitude is not impoſſible. This argument hath perplexed many great wits and learned men: But if we looke ſtrictly vpon it, we may obſerue how it it is not formed out of the notion of the ſubiect in queſtion (that is, of infinite) but, out of the quality of God almighty and the Logicall notion of Poſſibility: And ſo, may be a hard argument, but not a demonſtration. And will appeare to be a fallacy, if one reflecteth that the notion of infinity may agree to a thing in potentia, but not to a thing in Act: And therefore it can not be ſuppoſed that God hath done or will do all that he can do. According to which courſe, if in this queſtion of the ſoules im-

mortality, they frame a ſubtile argument out of what is common to all formes, or out of the nature common to all ſoules; and withall diſcerne not how it may be vntyed; They preſently perſuade themſelues they haue demonſtrated what they intended. Nay, though their diſcourſe be drawne but out of the Logicall notions of contraries, of antecedents, and conſequents, or out of ſome parity betweene the ſubiect they treate of and ſome other they compare it to; they ſtraight flatter themſelues with a conceit that they are arriued to ſcience in that point. Not conſidering, that *to know*, requireth that one be abſolutly certaine that his proofe be a firme demonſtration; and not onely, that it be ſuch an implicated Gordian knotte, as that neither he himſelfe nor any others he hath yet mett with, are able to vntie it; but that truly and really, of its owne nature, it be impoſſible to be vntyed and ſolued.

And ordinarly, they who ground their diſcourſe vpon common and remote propoſitions (as for example, they who vſe Lullies art) do vnwarily ſlide ouer ſome vnſound ſteppe betweene the axiome they rely on, and the concluſion they would inferre, which they ſee not. Whence it happeneth, that ſuch manner of arguing, rather ſerueth for oſtentation, then to acquire true knowledge. And as for ſuch Logicall termes as we haue aboue mentioned; it ſeldome happeneth but that they are lyable to ſome æquiuocation or other; which quite eneruoth the force of any proofe deriued from them.

Both theſe ſortes of perſons do erre in aſſenting too lightly to an apparent proofe, and in taking that for a demonſtration which in effect is none. But a third ſort there is, who faile on the contrary ſide; by conceiuing that a demonſtration is neuer made, as long as any thing can be vrged againſt the Con-

cluſion prooued by it. This ariſeth from a great deficiency both of witt and of Iudgement. Of iudgement ; becauſe they are not able to diſcerne the euidence of a diſcourſe in it ſelfe, but are faine to looke into externall accidents to frame their opinion of it. And of witt; in that they obſerue not how the force and ſubtility of mans witt is ſo great, as to ſpeake (and that, moſt ingeniouſly too) in oppoſition of ſuch thinges as are moſt manifeſt. Zeno, euen whiles he walked with him that he diſputed with, would be thought haue to demonſtrated that it was impoſſible any thing could be moued in the world from one place to another. Anaxagoras was as peremptory that ſnow was blacke. We find ingenious Orations and whole bookes, whoſe ſcopes are to extoll the greateſt defects and blemishes of nature, as baldneſſe, lameneſſe, blindneſſe, vnreaſonableneſſe, and the like. What can be more euil-

dent then that 2. and 2. do make 4? yet Ariſtotle telleth vs, that 2. and 2. are are two diſtinct numbers; and that 4. is but one number; and conſequently, that 2. and 2. are not 4. And to conclude, the Academikes or ſceptikes haue laboured with much induſtry to take away all certainty. He were a weake man that would retaine his aſſent from an euident concluſion as long as ſubtile or cauilling diſputants do catch att ought to oppoſe againſt it. But a iudicious perſon, when he ſeeth a ſolide demonſtration vpon any ſubiect, is not att all shaken by any thorny difficulties that acute ſophiſters endeauour to implicate him in; which though att the firſt ſight they may a while perplexe him; yet he is ſure that with orderly reflection and due attention to euery ioint and progreſſe of their arguments, they are to be vnfolded and diſplayed; and the inconſequence of them to be made appeare.

THE SECOND CHAPTER.

Of the trew nature of demonſtration.

THat then which importeth vs mainely not to erre in, is in iduging when a perfect demonſtration is produced. The trew nature of ſuch a proofe requireth, that it make the reader or the hearer ſee euidently that the concluſion is directly ſo as the demonſtrator auoucheth it to be, and that it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe. Neither haue we reaſon to ſuſpect that this can not be performed aſwell in other ſciences as in Geometry; Seeing that there are definitions in all ſciences as well as in it; and that the termes of theſe definitions are linked together: And therefore it is obuious, that one concluſion maybe euidently and demonſtratiuely drawne out of another. This can not happen in a

ſcientificall diſcourſe, vnleſſe that which is taken to prooue, be either the cauſe or the effect of that which is proued. But if there be any failure in either of theſe, then the demonſtration can not be a perfect one. And though in ſubſtance it ſhould not be deficient; yet att the leaſt it would be ſuperproportioned on one ſide, and not according to the ſtrict rules of art; which requireth that euery truth be proued by his proper cauſe. As for example; if Rationality, of its owne nature, and out of the force of Rationality, be the cauſe of immortality; It followeth euidently that whatſoeuer is Rationall is immortall. And contrariwiſe; if Immortality, preciſely by being ſuch, do make the ſubiect vnto which it belongeth, to be Rationall; It followeth that nothing can be immortall but it muſt alſo be Rationall. So that if either of theſe be ſo, he who conſidereth theſe two termes, ſeeth clearely that of neceſſity both of them

muſt belong to what ſubiect ſoeuer he findeth either of them to reſide in; And why it is ſo; and that it is impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe. But if a third thing or terme, be cauſe of both; or be the cauſe of the one and be cauſed by the other; then the demonſtration is mediate, and as it were a double one: As, if immateriality be the adæquate cauſe both of rationality and of immortality; it is euident that whatſoeuer is rationall is immortall. But where the one ſide is ſuperproportioned; the proofe, though in ſubſtance it be true, yet is it not a proper and a perfect one. As for example; if one ſhould proue any thing to belong to a man becauſe he is a ſenſible creature; the effect, though it be in him, yet is it not peculiar to him, but common to all irrationall animals as well as to him. Such were the conſiderations that I had when I compoſed the two treatiſes out of which I concluded the immortality of Mans ſoule. For in them,

them, this is the ſcope of my diſcourſe: Corporeity and mortality, are adæquate to one another; the firſt as cauſe, the ſecond as effect: But a Rationall ſoule, is not corporeall: Therefore, not mortall. The ſubſumption I made euident, by shewing, that all operations whatſoeuer among bodyes, are performed by the diſpoſure of groſſe and ſubtile, or of denſe and rare, partes; and that what can not be effected by ſuch, is not the operation of a body. For, the nature of a body (in as much as it is a body) is nothing elſe but to be a thing capable of diuiſion; or, that hath a poſſibility of being made many (which amounteth to as much, as to be lyable to deſtruction; ſince the diuiſion of the partes that do eſſentially compoſe any thing, is the deſtruction of it.) And the origidall difference of bodies, is, that ſome are more ſubiect to ſuch diuiſion, that is are more eaſily diuided; others with greater difficulty;

which reſulteth meerely out of the partes being groſſer or ſubtiler. So that, ſeeing the very eſſence of a body is, to be a collection of ſuch partes; It is euident that what can not be performed by ſuch partes, is beyond the orbe of ſole and meere bodies, and cannot be atchieued by them. It is trew, that in all the firſt treatiſe, which is of the nature of Bodies, I haue neither eſtabliſhed nor made any mention of this Principle; but haue reſerued it to the ſecond, where I make vſe of what is ſettled in the former, to diſcouer the nature of the ſoule: And the reaſon why I haue done ſo, is, becauſe the ſlight mocke-Philoſophy of this Age, not reaching to comprehend the true difference betweene a body and a ſpirit, eaſily ſwalloweth ſpirituall qualities in bodies, and as familiarly attributeth corporeall proprieties to ſpirits: And therefore I was obliged to runne briefely ouer the nature of all bodies, and to ſhew how

all their operations (euen the moſt refined ones, and that ſauour moſt of a ſpirituall nature) may be performed by the meere diſpoſition of groſſe and ſubtile partes; there by to preuent the obiections that might be made me from ſuch corporeall actions as vulgar Philoſophy diſpatcheth like ſpirituall ones. And I thought is not ſufficient for a iuditious readers ſatisfaction, to do this onely by bare caſting a compoſition in the ayre; as Monſieur des Cartes & ſome others haue very ingeniouſly attempted to do: but I haue endeauoured to ſtrengthen the proofes riſing from the force of diſcourſe, by accompanying them with ſuch further obſeruations as do clearely euince that whither or no I hitt right on all the particular lines that I trace out for the performance of thoſe actions, yet it can not be doubted but that their cauſes are compriſed vnder thoſe heads I haue there eſtablished; and that the wayes by which

they are brought to effect, are not vnlike, (if not the very ſame) to thoſe that I haue pitched vpon. This being the worke of the firſt treatiſe ; The ſecond looketh into the operations of a rationall ſoule; And hauing diſcouered their nature, it sheweth that they cannot be performed by the meere diſpoſition and ordering of groſſe and ſubtile partes of quantity or of a body; and by conſequence , that they proceede from an immateriall and ſpirituall ſubſtance. Now here, vſe is made of the former principle :for, it being made euident , that nothing but corporeity and diuiſibility is the cauſe of corruption , and of ſubiecting the thinges where they reſide to the ſeruitude of Mortality; it followeth indefectibly , that the ſpirituall ſubſtance which we call a ſoule, can not be mortall and corruptible. This is the whole ſcope and diſcourſe of that booke: out of which , for the reaſons I haue already touched, I will here ſelect

onely three of the proofes contained in the latter treatiſe, to shew that our ſoule is a ſpirit, voyde of all quantity and materiality.

THE THIRD CHAPTER

The Immateriality of the ſoule proved out of the Nature of vniuerſall termes or Propoſitions

THE firſt of them is drawne out of the nature of vniuerſall termes or Propoſitions. Logicians do define an Vniuerſall terme or Notion, *To be that, which being the ſame, may be affirmed of many.* Metaphyſicians define it to be, *Somewhat that is the ſame in many.* But to ſpeake more familiarly to common ſenſe, we may ſay, *That it is, ſomewhat which is any of many.* For when we ſay, *Peter is a man, Iohn is a man, and Paul is a man*; If *Peter* and *man* be not the ſame thing, the ſaying is

falſe: And the like is of euery one of the other two; to witt, if Iohn, or Paul, be not a man. Againe; ſeeing that one man is not two men; If when I ſay, *Peter is a man*, the thing which I ſay of Peter were the ſame thing which is Iohn; Such my ſaying would alſo be falſe; for, Peter would be Peter and Iohn too, by being the man which is both Peter and Iohn. The notion therefore of *Man*, which is truly reported both of Peter and of Iohn; is not *both Peter and Iohn*; but *either Peter or Iohn*. And this is that which we call an vniuerſall. This being hitherto euident, the demonſtration proceedeth thus: We ſee that the *thing* which we call *Peter or Iohn*; doth gett, by being in the ſoule, to be a *thing* that is *either Peter or Iohn*: But this condition or quality, *to be either this or that*, or *to be a thing that is either this or that*; can not be had or gotten by the nature of a body, or by the diſpoſition of ſubtile and groſſe partes: Therefore, the ſoule;

in, and by which, it getteth this condition; is of a different nature from Bodies. If here any one should anſwere me, that howſoeuer our wordes may ſeeme vnto him who ſhall ſticke and criticiſe vpon them, to import that there is a notion in our minde, when we ſpeake them, correſpondent to thoſe wordes; which notion is no one of the ſubiects it is affirmed of, and yet is common to them all: Neuertheleſſe, if he looke carefully into his minde, he ſhall finde that in truth there is no nature of Vniuerſality there. For if he examine what picture he hath in his braine when he reflecteth vpon the notion of a man which he calleth an Vniverſall; he ſhall finde there the image of ſome particular and determinate man; and no ſuch thing as a man in common. To ſuch a perſon as ſhould ſay thus, I might reply, that to endeauour ſatisfying him with a long diſcourſe, might ſeeme as ill placed paines as if I ſhould go about to

proue with learned arguments, that there are ſuch bodies in the world as men call fire, water, earth, and the like. For euery mans ſenſes of ſeeing and feeling, that are not depraued and corrupted, do aſſure him that they are, and that he continually is conuerſant with them. In like manner, it is as euident to euery man who hath common ſenſe and reaſon, and who reflecteth vpon what paſſeth in his vnderſtanding when he ſpeaketh ſuch propoſitions, or conſidereth ſuch termes, as we haue euen now inſiſted vpon; That indeed there is an Vniuerſality in them. And therefore, if he be ſo vnhappy and short ſighted, as not to diſcerne in his owne minde, that which common and continuall experience enforceth euery rationall man who looketh into the nature of vnderſtanding and diſcourſe, to owne and confeſſe; he should, in ſpeculations of this nature, content himſelfe with belieuing the multitudes of others who are capable of

iudging of them (as blind men, ought to relye vpon thoſe whoſe eyes are not vitiated, in matter of colours) and not hazard his actions and his æternall wellfare (which dependeth of his actions in this life) vpon his owne ſoddaine and ſlight conceit, in a matter whereof he hath no skill: As they do, who to iuſtify the ſtrength of their wittes, will not onely ſpeake and argue, but alſo liue, as though they belieued there where no life for the ſoule after the bodies death. But to be more indulgent to him then ſo; I ſhall deſire him to examine his inſtance, and to conſider, that as when a ſquare (for example) or a triangle delineated vpon paper, is propoſed vnto a Mathematician to looke vpon, there by to diſcuſſe ſome Geometricall propoſition; though that ſquare or triangle there drawne, be a particular determinate one, ſo and ſo formed, of ſuch and ſuch preciſe dimentions in each line and angle, and the like: yet the figure that is

in his head, abſtracteth from all thoſe particular circumſtances that accompanye either of theſe vpon the paper, and agreeth to any ſquare or to any triangle imaginable, be their lines neuer ſo long or short, or drawne with red inke or with blacke, &c. In the ſame manner, that corporeall figure of a man which appeareth to our reflexion and reſideth in our fantaſy, is not the notion of a man that we here meane and ſpeake of. But it is euident to any one who shall looke heedefully into his vnderſtanding, that from the particular picture of ſome one man which his fantaſy repreſenteth to him, his vnderſtanding hath gathered and framed a large notion of man in generall, which is applicable and indifferent to euery particular indiuiduallll man. As is euident, if we looke into our owne meaning and intention, and conſider what will ſatisfy vs; as when (for example) I ſtand in neede of ſome one of my ſeruants to do ſome thing about me

and therefore do call or ring a bell for ſome of them to come to me ; which ſoeuer of thoſe that wayte without, cometh in, my turne is ſerued and I am ſatisfyed. In like manner, if a tenant is to pay me ten pounds; It is allone to me, whither he bringeth it in halfe crownes or in shillinges or in ſix pences. And therefore it is euident that my intention aymeth no further then att a common notion ; and that I know ſo much. Now, my intention being regulated by my apprehenſion preceding it ; it is cleare that my apprehenſion is alſo of the like nature; that is to ſay, it is indifferent and common to any one in particular. It may be further obiected, That from the apprehending of a thing which is indifferent to many, it can not be deduced that the apprehending nature is not corporeall but ſpirituall : for when we looke vpon an obiect a farre off, before we can diſtinguish enow particulars of it, we are irreſolute

what it is; whither (for example) it be a horſe, or an Oxe: And yet no man will inferre out of ſuch indifferency that the eye in which it is, is a ſpirit and not a body. To this I anſwere, that the ſuppoſition is a falſe one; there is no ſuch indifferency in the eye as is intimated: all that is there, is preciſely determinate: For, the whole obiect, and euery part of it, concurreth to the making of the picture in the eye; and conſequently there muſt needes be in the eye a repreſentation of the whole and of euery minute part of it; which is, a complete determination of it. Whence it appeareth, that the indetermination we haue of the obiect, is ſeated meerely in the vnderſtanding; which iudgeth it but imperfectly, by reaſon of the weake though entire picture that the obiect hath imprinted in the eye. And accordingly, a painter that were to draw that obiect att that diſtance, muſt compriſe it within ſuch lines as the eye receiueth from it. But that

which in this caſe is indiſtinct and indifferent, is our knowledge, which reſideth in our minde. For, it not being able to determine by the figure that the eye ſendeth to the fantaſy, whither it be of an Oxe or of a horſe; remaineth ſuſpended, with an indifferency to attribute it either to the one or to the other. It may be further vrged; that ſuch indifferency of our ſoules thoughts, is no argument of her being a ſpirit: for if it were, ſpirituall ſubſtances would be accompanyed with ſuch indifferency: the contrary whereof, is euident; ſeeing that no Angell (for example) can be either Michael or Gabriell; but is preciſely ſuch a one determinate Angell, diſtinguished from all others. To this I anſwere, that I do not vrge ſuch indifferency as a condition propper to ſpirits. For, in truth, they are more determined then bodies, by reaſon of their indiuiſibility. The which is ſeene in theſe very notions; that are more determined

then the bodies from whence they are drawne, merely becauſe they are in a ſpirituall ſubiect. But by this indifferency in the vnderſtanding, ſpringing from a determinate obiect; and by ſuch transformation there, of corporeall natures, to a quite different manner of being then they are in themſelues; I gather a different nature (that is, a ſpirituall one) in the ſubiect where they are thus transformed. For, that bodies can be in our minde (as they are when we thinke of them) notwithſtanding ſuch indifferency (which accordeth not with their nature) is an euident freeing of the minde from corporeall bondes.

Now, that ſuch a nature as this, of indifferency to diſtinct and different thinges; can neither be in it ſelfe corporeall, nor be repreſented by bodies or by ſubtile and groſſe partes variouſly diſpoſed; is ſo euident that it were a vaine labour to go about to prooue it. The meere caſting of our eyes vpon materiall thinges,

conuinceth it, without needing further diſcourſe. We can not conceiue a chaire, a knife, a houſe, a metall, a plant, an animall, or any viſible thing what ſoeuer, to be in it ſelfe without an actual termination. No Statue, no picture, no manufacture, nor ought in the world (excepting intellectuall expreſſions) can be imagined to bee, without its being confined in all determination to ſuch other bodies as compriſe, enuiron, & beſett it. Whoſoeuer can doubt of this, is incapable of any euidence. And conſequently, where we ſee an abſtraction from all determination, and ſuch an indifferency as we ſpeake of; we may ſecurely conclude, that the ſubiect where it is made and where it reſideth, and whence it hath it, is not of kinne to bodies, but is immateriall and ſpirituall.

THE IV. CHAPTER.

The Immateriality of the ſoule, proued out of the Nature of Vnderſtanding.

THE ſecond proofe of our ſoule's immareriality and ſpirituality, I deriue from her manner of operation when she vnderſtandeth any thing. That which she then doth, is to compare the thing by her vnderſtood, with ſome other; and by the relation or reſpect that is betweene them, she knoweth the nature of that thing which she ſo conſidereth or compareth. So that we may conclude the particular prerogatiue of a ſoule is, *to haue* or rather *to be, a power of comparing one thing to another.* And in truth, if we looke well into the matter, we shall perceiue that the notion which we frame of her vnder this conſideration, compriſeth all her whole negotiation

gotiation. For, when the notion of *Existence* or *Beeing* is once imprinted in the ſoule, all others whatſoeuer are nothing elſe but reſpects to *Beeing*. Thus, when we conſider what that is which we call *a thing*; we find, it is that which *hath Being*; or which *can haue Being*. The *Quantity* of a thing, is; what reſpect a determinate thing hath to the Being of the world; which in plainer termes is, how much ſuch a thing taketh vp of the extenſion that ſtretcheth out or that belongeth to the great bulke of what is corporeall. The *Qualiiy* of a thing is, what relation or reſpect it hath to other thinges that are of its owne nature and line. The other ſeuen Prædicaments, or Claſſes of notions, are manifeſtly comparatiue betwixt diuers thinges conſidered together: All which I haue ſo fully explicated in the ſecond part of my diſcourſe of the Immortality of the ſoule, and is in it ſelfe ſo plaine; that I will not enlarge my ſelfe further vpon it

here, where for your ſake I am as ſuccinct as I can; referring you to that, if you should deſire further explication of this matter. Now theſe tenne rankes, or rather generall heads, of notions, comprising all the thinges and creatures that are or may be in the world; and they being all of them comparatiue, and nothing but reſpects of one thing to an other: And all the working of our ſoule, being grounded vpon her notions: It followeth euidently, that all her notions being compariſons and reſpects, her nature muſt neceſſarly be the power of comparing or of making reſpects. Which how plaine ſoeuer it be in theſe notions of her firſt operation or of ſingle apprehenſions; It is yet clearer in her ſecond operation of deeming, iudging, or knowing. For, this is nothing elſe but a comparing of one notion to an other, and of compounding them together: As when we ſay, *the wall is white*, or *a man is a reaſonnable creature*, we

looke vpon the notions that we haue of the extremes, and conſider what reſpect they haue to one an other; and do find that they are vnited and identifyed betweene themſelues by the force of Beeing. The very ſame that we find of this ſecond operation of our ſoule, belongeth to her third; which is but a multiplication of her ſecond: for, *diſcourſe* is noething elſe but a double or a treble compoſition; which being taken in pieces, euery one of them is a ludgement or enunciation: and conſequently, the worke of comparing which is performed in a ludgement, is but multiplyed or repeated in a diſcourſe From theſe three operations of the ſoule, do ſpring her affections within her ſelfe, and her proceeding to action without her. For, according to the apprehenſions she maketh of thinges, and to the ludgements that she formeth of them by comparing ſome of thoſe notions among themſelues, and to the conſequences she draw-

eth out of a further compoſition of iudgements; she is affected with a liking or with a diſlike of them: and accordingly, proceedeth to action for the acquiring or repelling of them. Beyond this, our ſoule neither doth nor can do any thing. All her whole negotiation is compriſed within theſe limits. And in all this, there appearing nothing but a power of comparing and of referring one thing to another, It is moſt euident that the nature of compariſons and of reſpects muſt neceſſarily be the nature of a ſoule, And that she is nothing elſe but a thing or a power of making Reſpects.

Lett vs then in the next place conſider what a reſpect is. Hath it any dimenſions? do any colors make it viſible? doth any figure or shape belong to it? doth it take vp any place? Or is it meaſured by time? All theſe thinges do neceſſarily accompany a body: And whatſoeuer is a body, is affected by euery one of them. But a reſpect, we

find hath neither length nor breadth, nor is white or red or greene, nor is ſquare or round, hath no dependance of time, and is ſo farre from taking vp place or filling of roome, that vnleſſe both the termes whichwe conſider as reſpectiue to one another, beindiuiſiblytogether, there is no nature of reſpect betweene them. Thus, in the reſpect of *Likeneſſe*; if you leaue out one of the termes on which the compariſon is grou nded, likeneſſe vanisheth; it is loſt. This ſquare which reſembleth that other ſquare, or this white wall which in being white is like to that other white wall; if you lay a ſide the other ſquare and the other white wall, likeneſſe is gone, and there remaineth nothing but a ſquare figure, or awhite wall. None of the Qualities or properties which inſeparably accompany bodies, haue any thing to do with this notion, *to be like*. It is euery way indiuiſible. If we aske our ſenſes, they will tell vs, that it is neither white nor blacke,

nor hott nor cold, nor ſmooth nor rugged, nor ſweete nor ſower, nor of any other qualification that they are capable of diſcerning. And when we turne to our inward Iudgement, we ſhall find that all theſe thinges and what ſoeuer can affect our ſenſes, are Reſpects. So that howeuer our ſenſes haue cognition of obiects by a materiall participation of them, our minde knoweth nothing but by reſpects, nor can acquire any knowledge but by them; and therefore, to be able to know any thing, she preſently turneth it into reſpects; And by doing thus, she is capable of knowing all thinges. For, reſpects do not hinder one an other. Bodies do exclude other bodies, from the place they poſſeſſe and fill. But reſpects, are ſo farre from shouldering out one an other, that they rather inferre and draw in one an another. And hence it is, that nothing can eſcape the knowledge of a ſoule, if she were not clogged by her body.

Now, to make vſe of what we

haue here explicated of the ſoules working by reſpects; and of the nature of a reſpect; let vs retutne to our Principle, that *what ſoeuer is done among bodies, is performed by the diſpoſition of groſſe and ſubtile partes*; and examine, what diſpoſition or ordering of ſuch partes, can make a reſpect. Wee ſee well, that the thinges which are compared and are reſpectiue to one an other, haue partes. The wall that is like to an other wall, hath partes: And that other wall to which this is like, hath alſo partes: But all that which their partes can effect about each of them, is but to make them be white. It is not they that make their likeneſſe. What new partes muſt there be added, or how muſt theſe that are already there be placed and ranked, to make the walles like? My eye ſeeth each of them to be white, and my hand feeleth each of them to be rough: yet neither myeye nor my hand determineth them to be like. But my vnder-

ſtanding which neither toucheth nor ſeeth them; yet by comparing the one of them to the other; findeth them to be like, which their generation did not make them to be. So ſtrange and ſo different from the nature of bodies is the nature of the ſoule.

I will not be ſo prodigall of your lordships time, or ſo abuſe your patience, as to apply my ſelfe here to anſwere a ſlight obiection that may be made from the petty apprehenſions of ſome moderne Philoſophers of the ſchooles, who conceite, that as well groſſe bodies as the ſubtiler ſoule are ſtored with reſpects; and conſequently, that according to what I haue ſaid, thoſe bodies ſhould be immateriall, and ſpirits: which being euident that they are not, the ſoules being ſtored with like reſpects, can not be an argument of her immateriality. Thus, when they explicate the nature of gtauity (for example) they tell vs, it is a quality whoſe nature is

re is to haue a reſpect to the center of the world: When they teach vs what the power of ſeeing in an eye is; they tell vs as grauely as if they bettered our knowledge much, That it is a quality, whoſe nature is to haue a reſpect to the animals action of ſeeing. When they explicate what it is to be in a place, they tell vs it is an entity in the thing placed; whoſe nature is to be a reſpect to the thing (or to the nothing, if you pleaſe; when they will haue it be in Spatio imaginario) that is called Place. And the like empty imaginations, by which they confound the common notions of thinges, making all Prædicaments to be relations, and affixing to them a ſurname of *Tranſcendentall*. For, ſuch diſcourſes are ſo wretched and ſo pittifull ones, that I thinke a neglect is fitter for them here, then in diſputing againſt them to looſe time, which should be better ſpent: Eſpecially to your lordship, whoſe sharpe eyes will at the firſt ſight looke

through the inanity and vacuity of them.

THE V. CHAPTER.

The Immateriality of the ſoule, proued out of her manner of knowing obiects without her.

THe third proofe of our ſoules ſpirituality, I deduce from her manner of knowing the obiects that are out of her. For the better explication of this point, I will make vſe of a corporeall example; which howbeit it falleth farre short of the wonderfull operation of the ſoule in this particular, yet it will conduce much to the illuſtration of it. Be pleaſed to reduce into your remembrance (my Lord) how you and I comming one morning into a faire ladyes chamber, (I am ſure you will not haue forgotten, nor be to ſeeke, whom I meane) we ſurpriſed her ſo attentiue vpon

her looking glaſſe, as if she had bin diſcourſing with the faire image that she contemplated there. She was ſo pleaſed with gazing vpon that beautifull reſemblance which her ſelfe made, as for a while she ſcarce tooke notice of our being att each hand of her: by which meanes we enjoied aswell as she, the ſame pleaſing ſight; till her ciuility making her turne from it towardes vs, bereaued vs of that picture, which our eyes muſt haue bin looſersto haue changed for any other obiect but the originall that shee then shewed vs. And euen then, looking vpon her face, how louely ſoeuer it was; our eyes could diſcerne no aduantage it had, of the faire picture in the glaſſe; ſo exactly was it drawne. Now if we aske the vulgar Philoſophers ofthe ſchooles, how this ſo liuely and ſo like repreſentation of this ladyes face was made in the glaſſe: they will tell vs, that the ſuperficies or out ſide of that criſtalline body, was imbued, or as it were

tincted and dyed into the very ſubſtance of it, with a certaine repreſentatiue quality, whoſe nature is to make it be like vnto the obiect or imbuing beauty oppoſed before it; in ſuch ſort, and as truly, as the quality of whiteneſſe maketh a wall white, or as quantity maketh a body become great. Now, becauſe likeneſſe is defined, to be an imperfect vnity betweene two obiects that are like one an other (for, likeneſſe is euer accompanyed with ſome vnlikeneſſe; elſe, they would be no longer like, but the ſame) we may ſafely ſay, that as farre as the looking glaſſe agreeth by its likeneſſe, without any diſagreement, to the obiect that it is like vnto; ſo farre, the glaſſe is the very obiect it ſelfe. Hitherto, I haue borrowed the aſſiſtance of the ordinary explication how Images are formed in looking glaſſes: which how erroneous ſoeuer it may be in them; yet being translated to our mindes, it will find there the truth which was from thence

wrongly tranſlated to bodies. For, euen they as well as we, do vſe to ſay (as Ariſtotle teacheth vs) that *the ſoule is its obiects*; that is, she is all thinges, by knowledge. For, knowlege is not made in the ſoule by addition of ſeuerall new entities, that ioyned to her do become the partes of a new compound: But muſt neceſſarily be a true impreſſion made in her; that is, herſelfe new ſtamped; And is as truly the very ſame thing with the ſoule it ſelfe, as the figure left by a ſeale, is the very waxe it ſelfe, (newly modifyed) in which it is impreſſed. And therefore it cannot be denyed but that the ſoule is truly the obiect she vnderſtandeth, as farre forth as the obiect is by her truly underſtood. And accordingly, we ſee that a perſon who hath a right vnderſtanding of any thing, doth make vſe of that thing in ſuch ſort as is fitting and agreable to the nature of it; applying to it what is requiſite to be applyed, and remooving from it

what is fitt to be remoued: ſo taking the knowledge which he hath of the nature of that thing (that is, the thing it ſelfe, as farre forth as he hath right knowledge of it) for a principle by which to operate; that is, for his inſtrument, or for a part of his power of working. Now, becauſe this inſtrument, this principle this knowledge, by which the ſoule worketh when shee hath occaſion to vſe it, is truely and really the knowing thing it ſelfe (that is, the ſoule) it is cleare, that by ſuch knowledge the knowing thing is truely the thing knowne; and the thing knowne, is truely a part of the knowing thing. If barely thus much, would ſuffice, without any further addition, to denominate or affixe the attribute of *knowing* vnto a thing wherein we find this perfomed; we might with reaſon eſteeme a looking glaſſe, or any materiall ſenſe of an animal (which in like manner receiueth materiall impreſſions from an outward obiect) to know, or to be a

knowing thing. But when we procede a degree further, and examine what more then this is in a ſoule when shee knoweth any thing, we shall find that whereas the firſt is nothing elſe but that a likeneſſe of an outward obiect is in the glaſſe or ſence which receiueth it; A man, when he hath knowledge of an obiect, doth know, beſides the likeneſſe of the obiect within him, that the thing he knoweth is without him. For example; one who heareth a bell ring; knoweth, that the bell is not onely within himſelfe by the cognition he hath of it; but alſo, that it is out of him too; to witt, in the ſteeple, by its proper Eſſence & exiſtence. This further addition then, to the bells being within him, That the bell hath a proper Eſſence and Exiſtence in nature (that is; that the bell *is*, or *is a thing*) is that which belongeth to knowledge; and denominateth the man in whom it paſſeth, with the attribute of *knowing*, or of being a *knower*. And this is not in the loo-

king glaſſe. For although it is true, that the outward obiect is in the looking glaſſe, as farre forth as it is not vnlike to its picture there, or as it is the ſame with it, and that the obiect without, ſmiteth and impreſſeth this likeneſſe in the glaſſe: Yet all this, amounteth not, to make the looking glaſſe equall to a man in point of kowledge; for this regard, that the obiect's being out of the looking glaſſe, is not in the glaſſe; whereas, the bell's being in the ſteeple, is in him that hath the bell in him by hearing it ring. And the like to this, is in the ſenſes of beaſtes: who hauing within them no vnderſtanding, vnto which the obiect may penetrate, their ſenſes do ſerue them but like burning glaſſes, that multiplying by their vertue the force of light, refracting through them, do ſett on fire ſome thing behind them: for the ſenſes of the beaſt ſtrengthening and encreaſing the action of the obiect that ſtriketh vpon them, do ſett on

working thoſe more inward gimmals which nature hath prepared within them for the conſeruation and good of that liuing creature. Now the vſe we are to make of this diſcourſe, is, to examine whither this oddes which a knowing ſoule hath ouer a repreſenting looking glaſſe, can be reduced to the diſpoſition and ordering of groſſe and ſubtile partes; which is all the way & courſe by which materiall effects are wrought. And in ſteed of that, euen nature her ſelfe preſently ſuggeſterh vnto vs, that nothing is more impoſſible then for the ſame bodie to be att the ſame time in two different places. But in our caſe there is yet a greater impoſſibility then that, to be performedby meere bodies: for it is not onely implyed that the body of the bell which is in the ſteeple, be in the braine of him that heareth it ring; but alſo that its very being in the ſteeple, be att the ſame time in the hearer. Which is a farre more vncouth matter then the former

(though that be impoſſible too) to be wrought by bodies. For, if its being in the ſteeple do include that it is not corporeally in the ſoule; then, its being in the ſoule doth bring along with it that it is not corporeally in her; and conſequently, that in her it hath not a corporeall exiſtence. Now if any Archimedes or Archytas or ſubtile Ingenieur, can deſigne ſuch an order of materiall Phantaſmes in the braine, or ſuch a dance of animall ſpirits, as meerely by them to make this be thus in the knower; I will acknowledge, that the part of him whereby he knoweth, (that is, his ſoule) is materiall and a body. But becauſe that is all together impoſſible, it can not be doubted but that shee is an immateriall & a ſpirituall ſubſtance.

If any man ſhall obiect againſt me, that this knowing of an obiect to be without the knower, att the ſame time that by his ſenſes it is brought into him; is no particular prerogatiue of a man: but is com-

mon to all beaſtes with him ; vhowe ſee moue themſelues to or from the obiects that they ſee or heare, in the ſame manner as a man doth; And yet for all that , their ſoules are not immateriall: I ſhall not make difficulty to anſwere, that if this could be proued to me , I would conclude their ſoules to be immateriall, and conſequently immortall, as well as mens. But the truth is; they miſtake much in making ſuch iudgement of beaſtes actions: they pronounce too ſoddainly, without examining as they ought from what principles ſuch actions procede : they are carried away by the outward likeneſſe of geſtures and behauiours betweene beaſtes and men, not conſidering how the one are determined vnreſiſtably to what they do , by the outward obiects working vpon them ; and that the others do determine themſelues by their owne election : All which I haue att large explicated in my often mentioned booke , where I treate of

the operations of beaſtes. Lett them call to minde how many and how ſtrange thinges we heare of, made with ſuch a reſſemblance of life that the beholder can ſcarce doubt of their being liuing creatures vnleſſe he were warned of it before hand; and yet, they are nothing but dead pieces of wood, iron, leather, feathers, and the like artificially compoſed; and the ſpringes within them, wound vp, and then lett looſe. As Archytas his doue, and Regiomontanus his like curioſities were; ſome of which euen imitated exactly humane voyce and wordes. As alſo is deliuered to vs by antiquity, of Memnon's ſtatue, that gaue Oracles when the morning ſunne firſt shined vpon his eyes; his prieſtes hauing in the night time ordered the engines within, in ſuch ſort that ſuth ſoundes and wordes should breake out of his mouth att the appearing of the ſunne. The like of which Monſieur des Cartes was confident he could

haue produced: and I belieue that Cornelius Dreble would haue performed the like if he had bin ſett about it, aſwell as he compoſed his organes that when the ſunne shined vpon them played ſuch ſonges as he had contriued within them. And the inuentions of ſtatues mouing themſelues in diuers poſtures and progreſſions are now a dayes ſo ordinary, that they may begett a credence of ſeuerall ſtories of the antients which haue hithetto paſſed for fabulous tales; as when they tell vs that Vulcan and Dædalus made Statues to behaue them ſelues like liuing perſons; And that Hiarchas called men out the walles to wayte vpon Apollonius Tyaneus, and the like. And when he hath reflected vpon theſe thinges, ſett him conſider, how infinitely the Architect of nature and of all creatures, ſurpaſſeth the ſubtileſt ingenieurs; And he will ſee that ſuch manner of arguing, carrieth no force along with it.

THE VI. CHAPTER.

That the ſoule hath a Being and proprieties of her owne: And conſequently, is Immortall. And of the nature and extent of the knowledge of a ſeparated ſoule.

THus, hauing gathered from theſe three proprieties of knowledge (which we haue shewed, are impoſſible to be performed by meere corporeall motions, or by the ſole diſpoſition of groſſe and ſubtile partes) that the ſource of knowledge in man is of an immateriall and ſpirituall nature: It followeth that she hath an Exiſtence or Being of her owne, and proprieties agreable to ſuch a nature: and conſequently, that she is a ſpirituall ſubſtance. For it can not be ſayed, that she is an accident; ſeing that all accidents imply a ſubſtance, of

a nature proportionable to them, for them to depend on. And therefore, if she were an accident, since we haue proued her to be of such a nature as cannot depend of bodies, there muſt, be in man ſome other ſpirituall ſubſtance whoſe accident she were. Which no man will obiect, ſeeing there is no pretence att all for any other ſpiritnall ſubſtance to be in man beſides his ſoule; And that the reaſon why any perſon denyeth her to be ſo, is becauſe they would not acknowledge any thing in Man to be immateriall and other then meere body. Seeing then that the ſoule is a ſpirituall ſubſtance, and hath an Exiſtence belonging to her ſelfe, of her owne nature and ſtraine; that is, a ſpirituall one: It is euident that her continuance dependeth not of the body, that in this life is her copartener; but that her Exiſtence ſtill remaineth with her, after the bodies death: which in familiar language, ſignifyeth that she is and

ſuruiueth after the body is fallen from her; and that its death, is her birth; and the breaking downe of thoſe clay walles, is the freeing of her from priſon, and the ſetting her att liberty: ſince by that meanes, she enioyeth fully and ſolely her owne Exiſtence, without being clogged and peſtered with a groſſe yoke fellow that will haue a share of it whiles they are together. Neither can it be ſurmiſed that any outward agent can, by working vpon her after this her birth out of the body, make her ceaſe to be: ſince by being a ſpirituall (that is an indiuiſible) ſubſtance, she is not lyable to any of thoſe operations or locall motions, or diuiſions that change and deſtroy bodies; or is in danger of meeting with any other ſubſtance that is of a contrary nature to hers. Beſides which, there is no meanes in nature that wee know of, to bring any ſubſtance to its end. Which I conceiue is ſufficient for this diſcourſe;

ſe; wherein your lordship will expect no more, then that I proue the ſoule to ſuruiue the bodies death, and to be in a condition like that of Intelligences or Angels: And therefore I will not troble you herewith ſuch Metaphyſicall proofes, as to make them cleare would require large explication and the laying of Principles a great way off: As for example, that (ſince Nature repugneth againſt annihilation) there can be no change in a thing that affordeth not matter to be ſuſceptible of a new forme. Or, that where Exiſtence is once ioyned immediatly to a ſubſiſtent forme whithout matter, there is nothing can ſeuer them.

But peraduenture ſome may conceiue I haue not giuen full ſatisfaction in this poinct, vnleſſe I anſwere the famous argument wherewith Pomponatius hath perplexed euen the learnedeſt men that were of his time, and haue bin euer ſince. For their ſakes therefore, I will ſumme vp in ſhort what he vrgeth

againſt the ſoules continuance after the bodies death; and in asſuccinct a manner, giue my ſolution to his difficulty. To this effect then he ſeemeth to ſay. Euery thing that nature maketh, is deſigned by her for ſome proper and peculiar action or operation. For it would argue her (that is to ſay, God, the author of of Nature) of imprudence, if she should bring forth into the world, an idle and vſeleſſe thing, that where to do nothing, and conſequently were to ſerue for nothing. Now, the proper operation of Mans ſoule, is to vnderſtand: phich action of vnderſtanding, is werformed by the ſoules conſidering the fantaſmes that reſide in the braine; and without ſuch fantaſmes, she can not acquire knowledge of any thing. But, after the bodies death, there remaine no fantaſmes for her to ſpeculate; they being materiall impreſſions from corporeall obiects; and conſequently, following the lotte of the ma-

teriall part of man that compriſeth and harboureth them. Therefore it followeth, that if she should be ſeuered from the body and ſuruiue it, she would haue no operation; but haue a ranke among ſubſtances for no purpoſe and to no end. For auoyding of which inconuenience, there is no other remedy, but to allow her Beeing a ceſſation aſwell as the Bodyes, when Nature hath putt a periode to all that she is able to do or is fitt for, by taking from her the meanes by whcih onely she was able to worke. This is the ſumme of his obiection. For the clearing of which, we may conſider, that an agent may be conceiued to haue two ſortes of operations; the one tranſient into the ſubiect it worketh vpon; the other immanent in it ſelfe. The firſt driueth to the performing of ſome effect; which being compaſſed, the action ceaſeth. As when an Artificer maketh ſome thing, or a Traueller goeth to any place; as ſoone as the

one hath finished his engine, or the other is arriued to his iorneys end, their working and their motion do ceaſe. But an action immanent in the agent, continueth working though the cauſe be taken a way which did ſett it on foote. As when a burning coale shineth or gloweth, though the fire be out, and the blowing ceaſed that kindled it: and as a bell hummeth, after the clapper or hammer hath done ſtriking it. Many ſuch conditions of actions we may obſerue in Nature, which the latines do expreſſe by Neuter verbes, as *Ardere*, *ſplendere*, *furere*, *ægrotare*, *inſanire*, and the like: all which do import a kind of exercise or actuall Exiſtence within the ſubiect of what they ſignify, without relating to any extrinſecall cauſe. The which, though they come verry short of the acts of our ſoule; yet of all corporeall expreſſions they come neareſt to them: There being in our ſoule, a kind of vitall reflection

in its proper acts; which being nothing but the very Exiſtence of the ſoule it ſelfe, doth comprehend and æqualiſe as much as in nature is performed by an agent and a patient and their working. In this manner it is, that the ſoule after her ſeparation from the body, continueth to vnderſtand obiects, though the fantaſmes that att the firſt ſerued her to acquire her knowledge, be taken from her. And euen whiles she was in the body, the ſpeculating of fantaſmes was not all the buſineſſe that belonged to her: for though it is true, the doing of that, was neceſſary for her to be able to ſtore her ſelfe with any thing: Yet she transferred the notions of thinges from thoſe fantaſmes into her owne ſpirituall ſtore houſe; and did, euen her owne very ſelfe, become the thinges which she vnderſtood; as we haue already explicated. So that she was built vp of the knowledges that she thus acquired by ſpiritualiſing of obiects and by con-

uerting them into her owne very ſubſtance. And that ſpeculation of fantaſmes which is attributed to her in the body, is rather a paſſion then an action: for the doing of that worke, is the ſoules receiuing impreſſion from thoſe fantaſmes. The retaining of which, is her knowing. And this knowing, muſt neceſſarily remaine alwayes with her; ſince it is nothing elſe but she her ſelfe ſo moulded and ſo impreſſed. That is, her owne *Being*: which becauſe it is a ſpirituall one, and ſupetior to corporeall ones, doth reſume in it ſelfe the two natures of Eſſence, and of Operation that in bodies are ſeparated: And ſo is, both her *Being* an her *worke*. And conſequently she knoweth and vnderſtandeth (which is her proper operation) when she is ſeuered from the body and hath no more fantaſmes to worke by. But it is a kind of ſtanding or fixed ſtate of knowing (if ſo I may ſay) and immanent in

her ſelfe ; (as the ſhining or glowing of a fire coale, ſeemeth to vs to be) not att all accompanyed kith motion , as is her gaining of knowledge in this life. Which will be better vnderſtood , if we conſider how her firſt obiect, is *Being* ; and that her firſt operation , or vnderſtanding, is to be Being, (as, whoſe eſſence is nothing elſe but a capacity of knowlege , or of a new manner of being *Being*) and that all the reſt of her vnderſtandinges, are nothing elſe but *to know other things to be* ; or , for her to be the Being of other thinges : that is , to identify them with her ſelfe by this imbibition of Being , that ſinketh the obiects into her. And therefore , when a ſoule is once completly become all thinges (that is, that she knoweth all thinges) which she becometh in the very inſtant of her ſeparation , and indeede , by her ſeparation from the body ; It is euident , she needeth no further action to gaine any thing or to better her ſelfe. For she hath

thenall that she is capable of hauing: and is att the periode she was made for. And consequently, Pomponatius his argument is of no force, since after the bodies death the soule may continue that operation (of knowing) which she is made for: And not onely continue it, but haue it infinitly exalted and refined ouer what it was in the body.

By my answere to this obiection, I am led to obserue how a separated soule must necessarily retaine knowledge of whatsoeuer she knew in the body. For, since her knowledge of any thing is her very Being the thing she knoweth; It followeth, that as long as she conserueth her owne Being, the knowledge of that thing must remaine with her. But doth her knowledge reste here? Hath she acquired by this second birth, no addition to the stocke she had bin toylesomely trafficking for in this life? A childe in his mothers wombe, hath no other cognition then such a dull and limited one as his sen-

ſeeb touching or feeling could afford him; but as ſoone as he is borne into this worldes light, he receiueth impreſſions by his eyes of the colors, figures, magnitudes, and other qualities, of all kindes of bodies that enuiron him: And shall a ſoule, borne into that bright day of intellectuall light, ſee then no more then she saw here in her darke priſon? She shall certainely. And not onely ſee more, but ſee ſo much more, that it euen dazeleth our eyes to looke vpon the exceſſe of her ſeing. Let vs proceede by ſteppes; and conſider how the ordering of a few notions, begetteth new knowledges and concluſions, that he who was iimbued with thoſe notions neuer dreamed of, till he had marshalled and ranked them in ſuch order. And by new ordering and weauing thoſe new concluſions among themſelues and with his former notions, he further acquireth new knowledges. Which the more numerous they grow, the big-

her and larger is their multiplication; like numbers, which by euery addition of a new figure, do encreaſe their valewes tenne folde. Thus, ſciences do grow, from a few plaine obuious principles to the vaſteneſſe we admire. So, the ſcience of Mathematikes, by enterweauing a few axiomes and definitions, ſprooteth out, into an vnbelieuable progeny of ſubtility and variety. Likewiſe, the ſcience of Metaphyſikes, by ordering ſuch notions as occurre to euery man of common ſenſe, runneth ouer the whole machine and extent of all that is: And not content with the whole world of bodies, and of what is meaſured by time, ſoareth with a bold wing and piercing eye into a new world of Intellectuall inhabitants; where finding them ſettled by their nature in a ſtate of æternity, she perceiueth time that deuoureth all thinges beneath their orbe, ſlide weakely vnder them into an abyſſe of nothing; without being able to

giue the leaſt attainte to their ſublimed nature. All this is done, meerely by orderly diſpoſing thoſe notions that by our ſenſes we acquire. And if theſe, in a man (whoſe groſſe allay of a body, ſo cloggeth and benummeth the vigour of his ſubtile inhabitant) do grow vp toſo incredible a bulke and height; what will their extent be in a ſeparated ſoule, that is all actiuity? Her nature, is, to be an orderer, or rather, to be an order it ſelfe: for whatſoeuer proceedeth from her, is orderly: which it would not be, if order were not firſt in her. Order then being in her, it muſt be her nature; ſince all is nature and ſubſtance, in that thing which is indiuiſible. It is cleare then that whatſoeuer is ordered by an agent whoſe nature is order, it muſt needes be ordered to the vtmoſt aduantage that by ordering it is capable of. And conſequently, ſeeing that new knowledge ſpringeth out of the well ordering of precedent notions; It followeth, that what-

ſoeuer is knowable out of thoſe notions and principles, is fully knowne by a ſeparated ſoule. But when we conſider the connexion that all thinges haue one with an other, (ſeeing that all the thinges in the world, are but like linkes of a chaine, forged by an all knowing Architect; who doth all his workes, by the rules of perfect order and, wiſedome) we can not doubt, but that a ſeparated ſoule, by ordering thoſe knowledges she hath acquired in the body, and by reflecting vpon them with her vnlimited actiuity and energy (she being then entirely a pure Act) muſt needes attaine to the knowledge of all that is. And if we examine wherein this connexion conſiſteth, as it is in our ſoule; we shall find that it is placed in this, that the thing which hath one notion, is the ſame which hath an other. Whereby we find that the firſt notion we haue of any thing, doth by the nature of our vnderſtanding comprehend all

other notions; and that it can not be perfectly vnderſtood, vnleſſe all others be knowne. Wherefore, we may conclude, that a ſeparated ſoule, doth either comprehend no one thing, or elſe that ſhee muſt needes comprehend all thinges. As for example; If ſhe know her ſelfe, ſhe knoweth that ſhe was the forme of a body; & not onely of a body in generall, but of one ſo compoſed, ſo tempered, ſo formed, and all other particulars belonging to the body that ſhe is ſeparated frō. From hence ſhe gathereth, that this compound of ſoule and body, muſt neceſſarily haue a father and a mother; and by the indiuiduall proprieties of her body, ſhe inferreth the indiduall proprieties of her father and of her mother. Whoſe being ſuch, requireth further ſuch and ſuch other cauſes and circumſtances whereon they depend. And euery one of them, require ſuch and ſuch others that haue cauſed them. And ſo proceeding on from one to an

other, she discouereth not onely the first, but also all the causes that haue relation to one another: Which in effect, is the complexe of the whole world; since all thinges in it, haue (one way or an other) relation to one an other, either neerer or further off: As Maister White hath ingeniously and solidely shewed in the first of his dialogues of the world. And this is the methode of acquiring all sciences, by the vertue of syllogismes. And this vast extent of knowledge, will be the firmer and the stronger in her, out of this regard, that euery one of her knowledges will adde a confirmation and a verifying to euery particular that she knoweth. For all thinges in nature, hauing a perfect connexion with one an other; whosoeuer knoweth truly the nature of any thing, knoweth also the nature of all that hath reference to it, either as cause or as effect, or by any other regard that linketh them together. And thus, euery one of

her multitude or rather infinity of knowledges, riueteth faſter each other of them: euery one of them affording her a new reaſon, why that is ſo; like ſtones in an arch, where euery ſtone is not onely a ſupport to it ſelfe, but alſo to all and to euery one of the other ſtones that compoſe the arch. So that euery knowledge of hers, hath a ſuperproportion in a manner infinite, beyond any thing she knew in the body. And according to the ſtrength of her knowledge, is the ſtrength of her other actions, as, of deſiring or louing any thing that her knowledge informeth her to be good: ſince they proceede immediatly from knowledge; and are more or leſſe vehement, according as her knowledge decyphereth them more or leſſe abounding with the nature of good. Nor can she be deceiued by any appearance of truth, that may plant an Error in her, inſteed of a true Iudgement: which is euident, not onely out of what we haue euen now

ſaid, that euery one of her knowledges maketh good euery particular one in her; but alſo more immediatly out of this, that it is impoſſible for Contradictory Iudgements to dwell together in the ſoule; ſince one of them, is engrafted in her, or rather is identifyed with her, by the nature of Beeing; and the other, muſt conſequently be excluded from her, by not being; (as euen in in this life, we can not iudge any thing, att the ſame time, to be and not to be:) And therefore, ſince all that she knew in this world, remaineth with her in the next; and that out of the perfect ordering of that, she deduceth the knowledge of all thinges elſe, and ſo enioyeth the fulneſſe of ſcience in her; and that all shee knoweth, is alwayes preſent to her, as being in truth her owne indiuiſible nature, ſubſtance, and Being; it followeth, that no falshood (which is a contradiction of ſome truth incorporated, as I may ſay, into her ſubſtance) can haue

admittance to her beliefe: And if any were miſtakingly harboured by her during her abode in the body (which hindered her from completely ordering her notions, and from deducing true conſequences from them) this her new condition of abundant light, ſoone diſcouereth and cancelleth it.

THE VII. CHAPTER.

The anſwere to an obiection.

BVT if error, miſtaking, or falſehood, can not harbour in a ſeparated ſoule; And that the fullneſſe of knowledge, be the periode and perfection of her nature; It may att the firſt ſight appeare impoſſible, that any ſoule ſhould faile of being happy. For, ſeeing that a Rationall creatures deſiring of any thing, dependeth of the Iudgement that he maketh of ſuch a thinges being good for him: It would ſeeme, that there is great

Error in his knowledge, and much miſtaking in his Iudgement, when he ſetteth his hart vpon deſiring and longing after that which is moſt hurtfull and pernitious to him. To anſwere this obiection, I muſt entreate your lordship to looke into the nature of the will: Which though in ſubſtance it be the ſame with the vnderſtanding (that is, the ſoule her ſelfe, according as she is ready to proceede to action) yet as it is the origine of the ſoules deſires, and the impellent of her to action, It requireth a particular conſideration. We may then determine the will in a Rationall creature, to be a maſtering and conquering Iudgement or reſolution, that fixeth peremptorily vpon what is to be done. For it is cleare, that it is nothing elſe but a Mans immediate diſpoſition to worke, or to do ſome thing: And he is allwayes ready to proceede to action, and doth proceede thereto (vnleſſe he be hindred) as ſoone as his vnderſtanding iudgeth and

telleth him what is beſt to be done. Next, be pleaſed to conſider how we find oftentimes by experience, that after we haue iudged and determined by our reaſon and vnderſtanding, what is beſt and fitteſt for vs to do; there riſeth in our breſtes, a certaine materiall motion or tyde of ſpirits, that beateth vs off from that reſolution, and diſpoſeth vs an other way. If it happen that this inundation of ſpirits do chance to ebbe backe againe, and leaue the channell free for the calmer waters of reaſon to haue their courſe in; we returne to our former temper and Iudgement. But if a new flood of them do breake in vpon it, too ſtrong for it to reſiſt; then they carry the mans reſolution to their ſide. And according to the violence and repetition of their ſtrokes that beate him off from his firſt Iudgement, the reſolution that is made by them is ſtrong and vigourous. For as our very Being, and all our knowledges, in this world; are ma-

de by materiall actions: So, more, and ſtronger knowledges and iudgements, are made by more and by ſtronger materiall actions. And therefore, if theſe currents and tydes of materiall ſpirits, haue the force to make in a man ſtrong impreſſions and iudgements of the good they propoſe, and by a continued long beating vpon his vnderſtanding do in manner confine it to what they propoſe; they will in the end, as it were blinde our reaſon, and make vs thinke onely, or att leaſt chiefly, of the good and aduantage that they ſuggeſt. They will ſinke into the bottome of our ſoule, and ſettle there, the apprehenſions of what they recommend. And in compariſon of thoſe Apprehenſions, they will weaken the truth we ſee, making it appeare to vs like a dreame, or a thing in the ayre, that concerneth vs not. Which in this caſe, I may compare (not improperly) to oyle ſwimming vpon ſome heauier liquor

in a caske. For, that remaineth att the toppe, without motion or actiuity; whiles the water beneath, runneth precipitously out att the ſpigot into the veſſels that are fett to receiue it. In like manner, here, truth remaineth without all efficacy; whiles the contrary iudgements, do flow impetuously into action.

Now, when a man thus tempered cometh to dye, and that ſo his compound cometh to be reſolued into body and ſoule; It is euident, that in his ſoule, there muſt remaine a great inequality, betweene that ludgement of hers which concerneth the materiall good, and her other which concerneth the true good: And, that although the current of materiall ſpirits which was wont to foment this ludgement, be now gone, yet the effect of their ſtroakes (that very ſame effect which remained in her, when ſoeuer she had truce from their actuall aſſaultes) remaineth after death in the

ſeparated ſoule; and if it be the ſtronger, will of it ſelfe ſtill preſſe her on to the ſame materiall good, that the ſpirits which begott it, recommended to her. For by the ſtroke of death, the ſoule looſeth nothing of what she had purchaſed in the body: But all that she had or rather that she was there, is enlarged and heighthened by this ſecond birth of hers; And she becometh ſuch a thing, as the precedent moulding of her ſettled her in a capacity to proue; like as the ſeuerall parcels of warme mudde vpon the bankes of Nilus, do become ſuch various liuing creatures, by the laſt action of the enliuening ſunne working vpon them, as by their precedent diſpoſitions and circumſtances they were deſigned to be. Adde to this, that there is no formall oppoſition betweene two ſuch ludgements in a man. Lett the one of them be (for example) that it is good for him to go to a feaſt, to ſatisfy and pleaſe his ap-

petite; The other, that it is better for him to go to the Church to pray: And it is euident that the truth of this latter, doth not contradict the truth of the other; but both of them are consistent together. If then he dyeth with his soule fraught with these two Iudgements; death will leaue them both in his soule; each of them stretched out, in such sort as belongeth to a separated soule; but still, in such proportion as it found them in her, when it came to deliuer her out of her body. So that, if it found them in such a proportion that the Iudgement of good in going to a feast, did clearely ouerbeare the Iudgement of good in going to the Church; the desire of feasting in the next world, will likewise ouerbeare in her the desire of that good, for the obtaining whereof she was to go to the Church to pray. And although all the circumstances and possibility of going to a feast, be taken away, with the taking away of the

body; yet, the deſire of feaſting (which dependeth not of conſiderations to be made in the next world, but onely of thoſe which were made in the body) remaineth as freſh and as quicke as it was when the Man ſettled his laſt Iudgement and reſolution in this world. Nor doth it import, that a ſeparated ſoule hath no taſt to be pleaſed with meate or with drinke. For, as all her deſires were framed in the body; ſo, are they ſuch, as belong to a whole complete man, and not to a naked ſoule. And therefore, ſhe deſireth to be built vp againe an entire man, and to wallow againe in ſuch ſenſuall pleaſures as then preuayled with her. To which I may adde, that although a ſeparated ſoule haue not a taſt to relish meate; yet she hath a will to wish for it. And this will, is now to her, of a like nature, as to vs in this world, the wish of Beatitude; which dependeth of no other conſideration, nor is referred to any further End;

End; But is of it ſelfe the laſt End; as being deſired for its owne ſake; and not vnder the reglement, or to ſerue for obtaining of any thing elſe, more deſired then it. Nor doth it preiudice what I haue here determined; to conſider, that a ſeparated ſoule, is a pure ſpirit, deliuered from that impugner of Reaſon, her flesh, which vſed to draw her from her greater good. For we muſt not vnderſtand, her being a *pure ſpirit*, to ſignify her being an vntainted ſpirit: for she is wholy defiled by her habitation in the body. But she is called *pure*, by negation of conjunction to any body: which hindereth not, but that she may haue in her ſubſtance, the ſpirituall effects and contaminations of a corrupted body. For whiles she and her body were but one thing (both of them ſubſiſting by one Exiſtence) the agents that wrought vpon her body, did build and qualify her according to what she was to be when she was to be ſeuered from her

body, and to Exiſt by her ſelfe. Now if theſe agents were peruerſe ones, they hammered out ſuch effects in her as made her become a ſpirituall monſter of many heads, (which are, the reluctant and incompoſſible Principles that raigne in her) each of them drawing and tearing her a different way from the reſt; as in the next Chapter I ſhall more amply declare. And altough she erreth not in proſecuting her iudgements and deſires, ſuppoſing the principles from whence they ſpring; which are now naturall to her: yet all her operations, flowing out of thoſe principles, are ſtrangely defectiue, vgly, and monſtruous. And the reaſon why her Iudgements and affections in this ſtate of ſeparation, are naturall to her and vnalterable; whereas before they were but accidentall; is this: Whileſt she was in the body, there was no thought or Iudgement ſo deepely ſettled in her, but (by reaſon of her bodies ſubiection to externe agents) might

be weakened by the much importunity of other thoughts occurring to her and preſſing vpon her; and by litle and litle, might be worne away and forgotten: And therefore her nature, that was thus flexible and changeable in her ludgements and deſires, reſided purely in the common inclination to *Good* in abſtract or in generall; the which was common to all kindes of deſires; and ſo, onely the deſire of *Good* in generall, was naturall to her: All particular deſires, being but accidentall to her; and ſuch, as might be remoued by extrinſecall cauſes and agents. But when all this ſubiection of her to ſuch agents by meanes of her body, ſhall be remooued by death; and that no cauſes ſhall afterwardes be able to worke vpon her; and that she herſelfe ſhall be nothing elſe but a *Being* or a ſubſtance left out of theſe impreſſions, the ſtamping of which is now att an end; Thoſe deſires which formerly were but acciden-

tall, are now become naturall to her. And whatſoeuer she loueth for it ſelfe, remaineth ſettled and rinerted in her, as a ſupreme principle; ouer which none other hath any authority or preualence; and againſt which, nothing can be vrged to infeeble it. And in the meane time, all other iudgements and deſires that are leſſe preualent then theſe, do keepe their inferior rankes and beings, (without looſing ought of the clearenesſe of euidence that accompanyeth them) vntill an other change do come by the reioyning of her bodie to her. By all which diſcourſe it appeareth, how a ſeparated ſoule that is badly and vnequally built vp; is free from error and falshood in her ludgements; though her miſſeplaced affections and the improportioned compoſure of her will, do make her neglect her true good, for inferior and vnworthy goods.

THE VIII. CHAPTER.

Of the Miſery of a diſordered ſoule after it is ſeparated from the body.

HAuing cleared (as I conceiue) this great difficulty; I ſhall apply my ſelfe to explicate in the beſt manner I am able, the different ſtates, that the different courſes and manners of liuing in this world, do ſettle a ſeparated ſoule in. Theſe may be compriſed vnder two generall heads. For; there being in man two principles from which all his operations do ſpring; Reaſon and ſenſe; his ſoule and his body; It is euident that according as either of theſe ſwayeth and hath ſtrongeſt influence into his actions, his courſe of life is to receiue its denomination. I will begin with taking a ſhort ſuruay of a ſoule torne from the body of a man that ſpent his life

in the purſuite and in the enioying of ſenſuall obiects. It is already concluded, that all the Iudgements and deſires which a man contracteth in this life, do remaine in the ſepated ſoule, in the ſame proportion and exceſſe ouer one an other, as they were here. It hath bin alſo shewed that notwithſtanding ſuch a ſoules deſiring a particular and inferior good, more ſtrongly then she doth an vniuerſall and ſuperior one: yet is she not carried by error or miſtaking, to preferre the inferior good before the ſuperiour; but ſeeth clearely the difference that in truth is betweene them; and that the ſuperior good, is of its owne nature, preferable to the other; though, by reaſon of the temper she is in, she preferreth for her enioyment the other meaner good. Next, lett vs conſider the great vehemence wherewith the deſires of a ſeparated ſoule are accompanyed. Examples dayly occurre to vs, of the great earneſtneſſe wherewith paſſionate

men deſire and proſecute the obiects that their hartes are ſett vpon: In ſuch ſort, that neither difficulties, nor dangers, can diuert them from them. And yet, the greateſt and violenteſt of theſe, is not comparable to the leaſt and weakeſt deſire of a ſeparated ſoule. In her, there is nothing that can retard any operation that she is about: as in bodies there is; vnto whom, motion belongeth not but as they are moued by an other thing; and therefore, all that appertaineth to them in regard of motion, is in a manner reſiſtance to it, or a repugnant yielding to what is too ſtong for them: and conſequently, ſucceſſion of time, and conueniency of place, and a maſtering power in the agent that worketh vpon them, are required to all corporeall motions and operations. But a ſeparated ſoule, being (as we haue formerly shewed) an indiuiſible ſubſtance, and not meaſured by time, nor comprehended by place; and withall,

her ſelfe being the principle of her owne operations (which are nothing elſe, but her very being what she is) It followeth that whatſoeuer she doth or deſireth, is, with the whole energy of her Nature; whoſe force and actiuity beareth ſuch proportion to the ſtrength of the greateſt and moſt powerfull body that is, as all time doth to an inſtant, or as the whole extent of quantity doth to a point; ſeeing, that her actiuity (were she to worke) reacheth to all place, and to the whole maſſe of corporeall magnitude, in an indiuiſible of time. Now, lett vs apply theſe three conſiderations, to ſuch a ſoule as we haue propoſed for our firſt ſuruay. Her wearing out her time in the body, with continuall conuerſation among ſenſuall obiects; and through the loue of them, her neglect of rationall and intellectuall goods; will haue cauſed, that after death, her affections to them, will preuaile ouer theſe latter. Such affections, can

not

not be conceiued to be, but of one, or but of two, or but of a few, of thoſe materiall obiects; but of many, and of different natures. For the puddles of flesh and blood, hauing this property, that full draughtes of them do begett a ſatiety and loathing in in the perſons that feede greedily vpon them; their ouerburthened ſtomakes do ſeeke to pleaſe themſelues by variety; and do hope to find fresher and quicker delight in ſome new obiect. Thus, they trauell and wander as farre as they can, in this labirinth of vanity: One pleaſure ſtill ſucceeding an other: Their thoughtes ſometimes bent vpon richeſſe, otherwhiles vpon power; as often vpon honor and eſtimation from others; ſometimes vpon reuenge; and peraduenture continually, vpon the meaner obiects that in their ſeuerall kindes do affect their groſſer ſenſes. All this variety of affections, that requireth ſucceſſion of time to be contracted and enioyed in the body, will

reſide together all att once in the ſeparated ſoule; or rather, she her ſelfe will be all of them. Many of them, will be incompatible with one another: yet she muſt endure them all; & endure euery one of their drawing her a different way: like thoſe vnhappy monſters that ſome hiſtorians tell vs of, which being compoſed of two, or of more, different animals, vnited together by ſome part of their bodies common to them all, they are att continuall debate among themſelues, one of them deſiring to carry their whole loade one way, or to buſy themſelues about one thing, the other conteſting againſt that. But the incompoſſible affections of ſuch a ſoule, are yet more lamentable then can be repreſented by the ſad conflict of ſuch monſters: for, theſe latter, are not in the ſame indiuiſible place: they are but neere one an other; and they are not alwayes in oppoſition, and att warres, betweene themſelues: whereas, the ſoules

vnhappy deſires, do conſtitute and build vp her very ſubſtance; which being indiuiſible, they lye alwayes together in the ſame indiuiſible reſtleſſe bed: like ſnarling dogges, like angry vipers, and poyſonous ſerpents, perpetually biting and tearing one an other. Nor can any of them be layed a ſleepe, for one ſingle moment of time: They are continually awake, continually raging, and continually deuouring one an other: and conſequently, continually deuouring the bowels of that wretched ſoule that harboureth them. Who in the middeſt of this torment and miſery, ſeeth clearely that it can neuer haue end, as long as she hath being; she being now, no longer ſubiect to mutation: & that therefore she muſt remaine thus, for all æternity. But this tearing her in pieces by incompoſſible deſires, is but part of the torment she ſuſtayneth: She is ſo vnhappy, as to be incapable of enioying any one of thoſe obiects she ſo extremely thirſ-

teth after. None of them can follow her into that region, where she now dwelleth; nor hath the meanes or instruments to conuerse with them, were it possible (as it is not) that they could approch her and offer themselues to her. Consider now how great an anguish endureth that man, who hauing passionatly sett his hart vpon some beloued obiect, is hindered from enioying it. The proportion of his sorrow, will be according to the proportion of his desire, and to the actiuity of his nature. We see, how much the griefe of a quicke and smart person, exceedeth the griefe of a dull and heauy one: and particularly when it is for the priuation of the obiect that he prised most. We haue dayly examples, of men, that dye for such losses. How strangely excessiue then must the sorrow be of a separated soule, that wanteth what she so vehemently desireth, and that she is sure she shall neuer attaine to enioy? How great this sorrow and

anguish is, we can not comprehend, becauſe we can not comprehend the actiuity of a ſeparated ſoule. But we ſhall diſcouer enough to ſtrike vs with amazemēt & horror att the ſight of it, if we reflect, how ſorrow & paine worketh vpon a man in this life. It is euident, that euen in corporeall paines, it is not the body that feeleth that which tormenteth him. For if the mind be ſtrongly fixed vpon ſome other thought, ſo as not to attend unto what paſſeth in the body, or that by outward agents is wrought vpon it, (as happeneth in Extaſies, and in like vehement applications of the minde an other way) the man feeleth neither goute, nor ſtone, nor the inciſion of any of his limbes, nor the violent action of fire ſeering or burning any of his ſenſibleſt partes. It is the ſoule then that feeleth all ſuch paine; and the body, with its ſenſes, ſerueth but as the channell or conduite to carry it to her. Much more is it out of all queſtion, that the ſorrowes of the minde, reſide one-

ly there. It followeth then, that ſince onely the ſoule is ſuſceptible of torment; a ſeparated ſoule, muſt neceſſarily be lyable thereunto, in an infinite exceſſe beyond what an embodied one is capable of. Now conſider, how all the euill that can arriue to her, is, her being croſſed in her affections, and her being depriued of what she deſireth and tendeth vnto with greater actiuity and preſſure, then that wherewith the weight of the whole world would fall backe to its place and center, if after being remooued from it by a maiſtering force, it were ſoddainly lett att liberty to returne whither its grauity would carry it. And from hence we may conclude what a ſtate of violence, and of ſuffering contradiction to her nature, muſt ſuch a ſoule neceſſarily be in? It is euident, that all the torments inuented and inflicted by ſuch Tyrants as haue bin moſt ingenious in cruelty; or cauſed by the violenteſt and sharpeſt diſeaſes; are but shaddowes to

what ſuch a ſoule endureth. To heighten yet more the anguish she ſuſtaineth; she looketh with an enuious eye vpon the exceſſiue happineſſe that other ſoules enioy, who ſpent their time in ſtoring themſelues with ſuch true goods as now do ſettle them in ſuch a delightfull ſtate: shee ſeeth how eaſy it had bin for her to haue made her ſelfe one of that happy number: and how foolishly she tooke more paines to render her ſelfe thus miſerable, then they haue done to attaine Beatitude: ſince the ones courſe, was a calme ſmooth progreſſe in the high way that nature herſelfe traced out to them, and to all men elſe that haue the good fortune to diſcerne it: and the others, was a continuall toyleſome wandring in the rugged and ſtony bypathes, full of bryars and thornes, where ineuitable precipices ſurrounded them on euery hand. And she ſeeth that the thinges for which shee tooke all this paines, and for which

she now endureth ſo much, and loſt ſo much; were moſt vnworthy and moſt contemptible pleaſures; not deſeruing the name of pleaſures, euen whiles they were enioyed in their greateſt height; that she is ashamed, and hath horror, to thinke of: And yet, ſo wretchedly vnhappy she is, that she can not chooſe but preferre them infinitly aboue thoſe true goods, which att the ſame time she ſeeth do in reality and in ſolide eſtimation more infinitely ſurpaſſe them; And which therefore she can not forbeare louing and deſiring with a moſt vehement earneſtneſſe, though not ſo much as the maſtering affections that tyranniſe ouer her. And conſequently she is moſt vnhappy, vpon that ſcore too; ſince her miſplaced affections, haue rendered her incapable of enioying any pleaſure in them. How miſerable muſt we conclude ſuch a ſoule to be, though she remained in this ſtate for neuer ſo short a while? But when we conſider,

how she is to remaine in this condition for all æternity; that nothing can neuer happen to comfort her, or to asswage her torments, much lesse to lay them a sleepe for one small moment of time; that she is certaine they will dure for euer all in a heape, and each single by it selfe, corroding her bowels with the same raging violence; what distresse, what horror, what despaire must she be in? If the looking vpon eternity with our faint eyes, and the taking such a poore scantling of it as we are able, by adding of the greatest numbers we can comprehend in our fansies to others as great as they; then, multiplying them betweene themselues, and with their productes, till we haue wearyed out our selues, and exhausted the rules of Arithmetike and Algebra, in counting millions of yeares that it is to endure: And yet after all, we find that we haue not attained to so much as a shadow of that all comprising, neuer ending, eternity: so

that we grow giddy with ſeeking to ſumme vp ſuch an endleſſe account: What ſhould we conceiue will be the ſenſe, the horror, and the deſpaire, of ſuch a ſoule; who by the ſuperiority of her nature hath now full knowledge, in its moſt horride ſemblance, of that dreadfull eternity, whoſe bare shaddow (or ſcarce ſo much) ſtriketh vs into ſuch an amazement and affright?

By this little (very little, in reſpect of what this ſubiect requireth) Your Lordship will conceiue, what apprehenſion I make of the ſtate of a ſeparated ſoule built vp of improportionable and vnequall iudgements, by hauing in this life entertained her ſelfe totally or chiefely with materiall obiects, and ſettled her maſtering affections on them.

THE IX. CHAPTER.

Of the Beatitude of a well ordered ſoule, after its ſeparation from the body.

IT is now time that we turne ouer the leafe, and take a view of an other ſoule, that in this life hath cultiuated her knowledges and affections to the beſt aduantage; and hath employed her ſelfe, about intellectuall and reall goods; and hath contracted a loue of them; and in compariſon of them, neglecteth the other muddy ones that belong to flesh and blood. It is euident out of what I haue formerly ſaid, that the affections of ſuch a ſoule, when she shall be out of the body, will be wholly bent vpon intellectuall goods; as, knowledge, and truth; and that if she enioy them, she will be contented and happy. That she shall enioy them,

is already concluded; when we shewed, how euery ſeparated ſoule, is endowed with fulneſſe of knowledge, and shall vnderſtand and know all that is knowable in natute; which importeth, All that is, that euer was, and that euer shall be: And that she shall know all this, truly without any admixture of falſehood or error. But what degree of happineſſe she shall be in by ſuch knodwledge, is that which we are to inquire into: In doing whereof, we shall be faine to take our meaſures, by diſcourſing comparatiuely of her delightes, to ſuch as do delight a ſoule in this life; ſince ſuch a ſoule is ſo noble a creature, and ſo aboue our reach, that we are not able to iudge poſitiuely of her by looking ſingly on her ſelfe, in her owne nature. How great the pleaſures of ſenſe are, is but too eaſie to apprehend. Mankinde is continually too conuerſant with them, to be ignorant of them. And ſo powerfull they are, that we

dayly ſee men of excellenteſt partes, ſacrifice their whole liues to the purchaſing and enioying of them. But if we compare them with the pleaſures of the minde, euen in this world; we shall find that in reſpect of them, they are flatt, meane, brutall, and inconſiderable. We ſee dayly examples of perſons, that hauing bin deepeſt immerſed in thoſe, (and therefore can not be ſuſpected, to want the skill of guſting them) as ſoone as they haue come to relish the ſuperior delightes that are afforded by Intellectual goods (for euery taſt is not preſently fitted for them; being depraued by preoccupation of the others) they grow to deſpiſe the entertainements and obiects that formerly were the Idols of their affections; and do acknowledge, that one houre of contemplation of ſome noble truth, outweigheth in the ſcale of pleaſure, yeares of ſuch delightes as belong to ſenſe. But I muſt not content myſelfe,

with producing examples or authorities, to your Lordship: Such arguments are to be vſed onely to thoſe that can not penetrate into the natures and cauſes of thinges. You will expect from me, that I should lay the groundes, why Intellectuall pleaſures, do, of their owne nature, affect a man more then corporeall ones. This is eaſily and preſently done, if we but conſider what it is in Man that is affected with pleaſure: euen with ſenſuall pleaſure. And as before, in point of paine; ſo here, vpon the ſame principles, we shall finde, that it is not the body, but the ſoule, that is affected with pleaſure, and that the body and ſenſes, do but ſerue to conuey the outward obiects or motions, to the tribunall of the minde; who onely ſauoureth and embraceth them vnder the notion of delightfull. If she be diſtraught an other way, with ſome ſtrong thought that carrieth her from the preſent obiects and com-

pany; be the man att other times neuer ſo much affected with muſike, (for example) or with pictures and ſtatues, or with parfumes, or with pleaſant wines, or with like entertainements of the ſenſes: All theſe may beate att their dores; and yet he be ſo farre from being then delighted with them, that he will not ſo much as haue taken notice of them. If then it be the ſoule onely that taſteth pleaſure, ſhe onely being capable of cognition and able to make reflexion, (which are neceſſary circumſtances to the enioying of pleaſure) It followeth neceſſarily that in a well compoſed man, thoſe delights muſt affect him moſt, that are moſt agreable and proportionable to that part of him by which he is delighted. He who feeleth not this truth experimentally within himſelfe, may be ſaid to haue the complexion of his ſoule ſpoyled; like thoſe ill gouerned maydes, who by feeding on trash of bad nourishement, do

gett the greene ſickeneſſe; and then do loath meates of wholeſome iuices. For, the truth is (though it fall not within the compaſſe of this diſcourſe) that humane nature hath bin corrupted in its very ſource; like a child that ſucketh contagion from an infected nurſe; and is deliuered ouer, to ill affections, and to ignorance of what is good for it. Now, the proper buſineſſe of the ſoule, is the enriching her ſelfe with knowledge; and her ſatisfaction and contentement, is the contemplation of truth. If the doing that, in the loweſt and meaneſt ſubiect of knowledge, (qnantity, which is but the accident and attendant of bodyes; out of the conſideration of which, Geometry hath its birth) and whoſe verities haue no reall exiſtence in nature; but may ſeeme in reſpect of ſolide ſubſtances, to be but fine cobbewebbes ſpunne in the ayre; If that (I ſay) do oftentimes carry men of ſtrongeſt partes and iudge-

ment

ment by the delight and pleaſure they find therein, to the neglect of all ſenſuall pleaſures, and euen of their life it ſelfe; How great may we thinke muſt the delight be of him that ſhould haue the ſolide knowledge of whole Nature it ſelfe, and of all her reall and numerous progeny? If the contemplation of a few lines, Angles, and figures, whoſe Exiſtence is no were conſiderable but in the braine and fanſy of him that playeth with them (for they are but like ſport and exerciſe to the minde, to gett her an appetite to meate of ſolider nourishement) can carry away with the delightfullneſſe of it ſuch a man as Archimedes (one of the greateſt wits that euer were) ſo farre, as rather to part with his life, then with ſo pleaſing a thought: What pleaſure muſt there be in conſidering the whole machine of the Vniuerſe, and of all the bodies that are contained in it? to behold the beautifull proportion and ſymmetry,

that is in euery part of it? the admirable connexion, that is betweene each one of them? the nature of euery one in particular? and the long chaine of cauſes and effects, that runneth trough them all, and comprehendeth them all? But when from hence, we raiſe our ſelues aboue all this, and diſcouer a new world (infinitely greater then all this) of pure intellectuall creatures; that haue no allay of quantity or of bodilineſſe; that are not meaſured by time; that are not compriſed in place; that are ſtored with infinite knowledge; and that enioy all poſſible bliſſe and happineſſe, all at once; And that this *all att once*, ſhall be ſtretched out to a neuer ending Eternity: what wordes can expreſſe, how this thought muſt needes affect him that penetrateth duely into it? But, when to all this, he addeth, that theſe are not bare truths which are onely pleaſant to looke vpon, and do not concerne him in his owne particular: but that

indeed, whiles he contemplateth their nature, he informeth himſelfe of his owne: And that he doth not ſtudy this mappe, like a ſcholler that is learning Geography; but like an Emperor, an Alexander, that is prouiding to make himſelfe maſter of the whole region he ſeeth there abridged before him (for to ſuch a ſtate, his ſoule will arriue, when ſhe ſhall be out of the body) What ſoule-rauiſhing pleaſure can ye conceiue he then enioyeth? How litle muſt he fett by all the fond toyes that vulgar people buſy themſelues about? And how contemptible and baſe muſt he iudge all thoſe pleaſures that affect the ſenſes, in reſpect of this that now filleth, ſwelleth, and enlargeth his ſoule? Yet all this is but a ſhaddow; nay it is not ſo much; it is nothing; in reſpect of the pleaſure of a ſeparated ſoule that during her habitation in the body, cultiuated theſe thoughtes: Which we ſhall the better diſcerne, if we examine the differences that

are betweene the cognitions, from whence ſpring the pleaſures, of an embodyed, and of a ſeparated ſoule. When a man knoweth any thing, his ſoule ſpeculateth the fantaſmes that are in his braine; and by reflexion vpon his knowledge, he is delighted with it: and the more preſent he maketh it to himſelfe by cloſe reflection, the more is his delight: But the knowledge of a ſeparated ſoule, is alwayes eſſentially preſent to her; it is her very ſelfe; her owne very Eſſence & ſubſtance: which can not chooſe but affect her more vigourouſly and liuely, then what is but knocking att her dore. Next, a man can thinke of but one ſingle thing att a time; and att that preſent, be delighted with that onely: which is, becauſe his ſoule not being able to worke whiles it is in the body, but by meanes of the fantaſmes in the braine; and they being materiall obiects, and reſiding in a materiall place; the one of them shouldereth out his fello-

ves, whenfoeuer he cometh to the narrow window by which he is to shew himſelfe, and to giue an account of himſelfe, to the ſoule. But a ſeparated ſoule, shall in the ſame indiuiſible of time, reflect vpon all, and euery leaſt circumſtance that she knoweth; which is, all that she gained knowledge of during her whole abode in the body; and all that can be deduced out of that: which (as I haue formerly shewed) is all that is, or euer was, in the world, or euer shall or can be. And she shall haue perfect knowledge, not onely of euery one in particular; and of all the cauſes, effects, conformities, contrarieties, and ſuch other circumſtances as immediatly belong to euery one of them: But shall alſo ſee the connexion that euery one hath with euery one: how the ſeuerall linkes of this admirable chaine that containeth all that is in the world, from higheſt to loweſt, are ſo fitted to one an other, that if any one of

them were but broken or in diſorder, all would fall in pieces; and withall, are made with ſuch powerfull art, that euery one of them is a ſupport and a ſtrengthning to all the reſt: So that the whole empire of nature muſt be deſtroyed, before there can be the leaſt failing in any of the meaneſt of them. In the third place, lett vs conſider how an embodyed ſoules knowledge is but a kind of paſſion or impreſſion from outward obiects; and in all her operations, is dulled by her heauy and reſiſtent copartner: But a ſeparated ſoule, is a pure actiuity; a ſubſiſtent forme; no potentiality or reſiſtance belonging to it: So that nothing among bodies, can expreſſe the nature and manner of its working. It were too litle, farre, to ſay that her operations are like the ſoddaineneſſe of the ſunnes illuminating the whole hemiſphere, or like the quicke violence of lightening, when in the twinkle of an eye it reacheth from East to West, and teareth vaſt trees vp

by the rootes, and ouerturneth ſolideſt buildinges: for betweene ſuch, and the weake creeping of a ſnaile, there is ſome proportion; but betweene the other, none att all. In the fourth place, lett vs conſider how the pleaſures of this life conſiſt in ſucceſſion. When one part of them is, the other partes of it are not. Or rather, no part of them is preſent. For you can not aſſigne, not ſo much as with your thought, any preſent moment; but whiles you are thinking of it, it vanisheth. If the *Now* which you would pitch vpon, be more then an indiuiſible inſtant, part of it is paſt, and the other part not yet come: what you graſpe att, to ſtay it from ſliding by you, is ſuch an indiuiſible as may be called nothing; and yet that nothing, whiles you are but thinking *Here it is*, is flowne as much out of your reach as the firſt houre the world was created in. On the other ſide; the pleaſures of a ſeparated ſoule, are ſtretched out as farre as Eternity extren-

deth it ſelfe; by an vninterrupted ſucceſſion, of continuall enioying without any diuiſibility, or ſubſequent or precedent partes, of its durance: And do comprehend all ſuceſſion, all time, (were it multiplyed by the ſandes of theſea, vpon millions of yeares; and infinitely beyond all that) not in one permanent and ſtanding *Now*, of actuall comprehenſion of them by Exiſtence (which belongeth onely to God) but in an aſſurance and euident certainty, that her preſent happy cõdition is lyable to no change, to no viciſſitude, to no diminution, to no ebbing and flowing. The pleaſures that would require millions of yeares to taſt them all (and infinitely more) are here by a ſtrange Alchymy diſtilled and exalted into a quinteſſence of one minute, which minute is fixed for euer from fleeting, is permanent, can neuer fade, or the pleaſures of it relent in the leaſt degree. And in the laſt place, let vs conſider how great an allay to all the pleaſures of this

this life, is, the caſuality of them: the thought that they may betaken from him who enioyeth them, or he from them; and, that griefes and ſorrowes may ſucceede to the happieſt humane condition that can be imagined; is enough to ſower it all. But a ſeparated ſoule is ſecure that she can neuer haue her ſtate changed. She knoweth, that for all æternity, it will euer be the ſame. Her pleaſure being the reſult of her knowledge, she ſeeth clearely that there are but three gates by which any change can come in vpon it: And if all theſe be ſafely barred & fenced, she is out of danger of any mutation. Theſe three, are, either her ſelfe, who is the knower; or the obiects, which she knoweth; or the knowledge, that she hath of them. As for her ſelfe; her Indiuiſibility, and her immateriality, do exempt her, both from any inward principles of fayling within her ſelfe, and from the power of any outward Agents working to her preiudice.

And therefore, on that ſide, ſhe is immutable. As for the obiects ſhe knoweth; there can arriue no change in them, in regard of her: for though ſome of them be ſubiect to the empire of time, and conſequently are alwayes in a fleeting and changing condition; yet, thoſe changes ſhe is aware of; they are all preſent to her: ſo that if they did not change according to the law ſetled for their change, which ſhe is fully acquainted with; there would be a change in them, in reſpect of her. Laſtly; her knowledge, can admitt no change; ſince nothing of what ſhe knoweth, can euer be loſt by her; it being all as indefectible as her ſelfe; and indeed, her very ſelfe: Neyther can ſhe purchaſe any new knowledge to contradict or weaken what ſhe already knoweth; ſince ſhe already knoweth all that is knowable. And thus it is euident, that her pleaſure, being built vpon theſe indefectible and vnchangeable foundations, is im-

mutable, and will laſt in the ſame height for all eternity: And of this, she is moſt certaine; and conſequently enioyeth her happineſſe with all ſecurity. Lett vs now ſumme vp the account we haue bin making of a happy soules ioyes; and we shall finde the product ſo great as will amaze vs. We haue found, how the pleaſure of the ſoule, conſiſteth in knowledge; or, at leaſt, is a reſult of knowledge. And to preuent, that ſenſuall men may not thinke this to be but a dull and flatt pleaſure, in reſpect of the poinant ones that the body ſeemeth to be arbiter of; we haue shewed, how euen all corporeall pleaſures, are no otherwiſe pleaſures then as they affect the ſoule; and that it is onely shee, who is delighted with them: And that her owne proper and immediate pleaſure, doth affect her, euen in this life, without compariſon more then thoſe turbulent ones which come to her by the conduites of her ſenſes, after that cuſtome and due

perception of them hath once rendered them familiar to her, and hath restored her to the gouernement of that Common wealth which her vassals had gotten possession of in her minority, and whiles (as I may say) she was in her cradle and not yet awake. We haue found, that this pleasing knowledge is not onely, of one, or of a few obiects; (like those of men; who whiles they are intent vpon the delightes of one obiect, can not relish those of an other) but of the whole machine of the Vniuerse; all, that Gods hand mayde, nature, euer did, will, or can make, gouerne, and conserue; and how, when, and why, she performeth all her workes: Not onely in all the vast world of matter, (whereof we in this life, conuerse with, and haue knowledge of, but the least parcels) But also in the much vaster Region of spirits; who, besides the neere infinity of their number, haue yet this aduantage ouer corporeall thinges, that the meanest and lo-

weſt of all that innumerable multitude, is an entire world within himſelfe, infinitely greater richer more beautifull and excellent then all the whole vaſt world of bodies; And hath infinitely more power to worke what he will vpon it all, and vpon euery part of it, att once, (when the doing ſo, should agree with the rules of his wiſedome) then the ſtrongeſt Gyant that fiction euer built vp, can be imagined to haue in reſpect of mouing a ſlender ſtraw or downy feather, or of crushing a litle bubble vpon the water. We haue alſo found that this vnfathomable ſea of knowledge, is alwayes in a high flood of a ſpring tide on euery coaſt; not ſometimes ebbing on one shore, whiles it floweth on an other; but alwayes ſwelling and rouling euery where ouer all bankes that might hemme it in; and enioying all her ſeuerall knowledges, and the delightes of them, all att once; as intent to euery one of them in parricular, as to any one of them

whatſoeuer: Which are ſo farre from breeding a confuſion, that euery one of that incomprehenſible multitude, ſtrengthneth and heighteneth euery other of them; and is againe ſtrengthened and; heightened by it; and each, maketh the other be more taſted and better relished. Which taſt in her, is not a cold or flatt one, dulled and blunted with too much feeding vpon her delightes (as happeneth to corporeall ones, who looſe their ſmarteneſſe, either by the too great actiuity of the obiects working vpon them, as when too great a light blindeth ones eyes; or by being too much glutted with them, as when one ſurfetteth with delightfull meates; and the like) but is all actiuity; a kind of perpetuall growing in appetite; a continuall effuſion of it ſelfe with violent tranſport vpon this *All* and euery leaſt parcell of it, that ſo delighteth it. And yet this effuſion is not as vpon a pleaſant obiect att ſome diſtance from it

ſelfe; as when a man looketh vpon a faire picture or fairer originall, that delighteth him: Nor yet att leſſe diſtance, as when pleaſant wine or meate ſlideth ouer the palate that is affected with them, and doth mingle ſome litle atomes of their bodies with it: Nor as when more delightfull motions make a change in the ſenſibleſt partes of a mans body, to begett in him a higher ſtraine of pleaſure then all the former; then which, it may ſeeme that nothing can be neerer. But it is farre more intime to the ſoule then all this: It is she her ſelfe: All this pleaſure of hers, is engrafted vpon her owne very *Being*: It is a perpetuall effuſion of her whole ſelfe, vpon her whole ſelfe: she needeth no reflexion vpon it to make it preſent to her (as all pleaſures of the body do, to make them perceiued & relished) or rather, she is in a continuall moſt ſtrict reflexion vpon it, as hauing it moſt intimely and ſubſtantially preſent to her; for it is purely she her very

ſelfe: And therefore she is in a perpetuall, vninterrupted, chewing, relishing and enioying, with a moſt quicke ſenſe, hungry appetite, and incomprehenſible actiuity, of all and of euery one of theſe her wonderfull delightes. Which it is not enough to ſay she enioyeth all att once; meaning onely that she enioyeth the pleaſure of euery one of them att the ſame time: But becauſe her enioying is without ſucceſſion; It fareth with her, as with wine, for example; the actiuity and vertue of a whole tonne whereof is drawne into a ſmall meaſure of æthereall ſpirit: or as with the diffuſed ſunne beames; which being reduced to one point, do there become burning; whereas in their extenſion, they were but warme: So in her the whole maſſe and dilatation of delight which we may fanſie would take vp innumerable millions of yeares to runne ouer, is extracted into one Minute; into a perpetuall *Now*; And the vertue (as

I may ſay) which required to be diffuſed through all that vaſt ſpace, is ſublimed into this narrow roome: and yet againe this narrow roome, or the concentrated vertue of it, is multiplyed ſo as to be all of it in euery moment of ſuch a vaſt ſucceſſion: As if after the extraction of the the ſpirit, it were, multiplyed to fill againe the whole veſſel with ſuch: or after the burning glaſſes expoſition to the ſunne, euery line of light reflected from it or refracted through it, should become as hott and burning, as that ſingle one which maketh the toppe of the Cone that terminateth the ſunnes rayes. Now then, after we haue multiplyed ſuch exceſſes, ſuch burning pointes of pleaſure, by euery one of the ſeuerall innumerable pleaſures she enioyeth thus all att once, and that she is effuſed vpon with the whole actiuity of her Nature (which is all ſence, all fire) What will be the product and totall of ſuch immenſe particulars? The

vaſt number of atomes of ſand, that Archimedes hath ſo wittily ſett downe, and shewed was ſufficient to fill vp all the ſpace betweene our earth and the heauen; would not expreſſe this foote of our account; No not though it were neuer ſo often multiplyed within it ſelfe. For thoſe multiplications would ſtill begett but terminated numbers; whereas this, is beyond all number, as she is aboue all time, by being aboue and beyond all quantity. Laſtly, when for a crowne and full completing of all this immenſe delight and happineſſe, we shall conſider, that the ſtate she is in, admitteth no leſſening or change; that she is ſecure she can neuer looſe any ſmalleſt parcell of it, nor be interrupted in the full and vigourous fruition of it; but that it will laſt euer the ſame, for all æternity; and be as it were ſtill beginning, and ſtill fresh; Your Lordship (I believe) will not expect from me any further reflection vpon this dazeling ſubiect. I

will therefore put an end to my courſe and weake expreſſions, that fall infinitly ſhort of what I feele within me, when, in ſilence and in quiet, I contemplate the ioyes and bliſſe of a ſeparated ſoule, departed out of her body, after due cultiuating her ſelfe there, by ſuch a courſe of life, as Reaſon (could we but diſcerne and follow her directions) preſcribeth to euery man: The deuiating from whoſe rules, begetteth ſuch an vnhappy ſtate as on the other ſide of this medall, I haue endeauoured to engraue. Both which, I haue shewed to be vnchangeable, as long as the ſoules that enioy them do remaine naked and ſeuered from their bodies. But what alteration they may be capable of, if euer they come to be clothed againe by their bodies, and to be reunited to them; (by whoſe mediation onely, new impreſſions may be made vpon a ſoule) belongeth to an other place to conſider.

THE X. CHAPTER.

That the complete Beatitude of a ſeparated ſoule conſiſteth in the ſight of God.

MAy I not ſeeme vnto your Lordship to haue amplifyed & exaggerated beyond poſſibility of truth, the ſtates either of weale or of woe, belonging to a ſeparated ſoule? If it happen, that any beſides your ſelfe, do reade this diſcourſe (eſpecially if they be not inured to rigourous proofes, and to Metaphyſicall ſpeculations) I can not expect, but that they should looke vpon the immenſe happineſſe or miſery, I haue in it allotted to the share of a ſeparated ſoule, as an vnbelieuable Paradoxe. And they that should be moſt fauourable to me, will be apt to ſuſpect (according to their looſer manner of iudging morall affaires; which endu-

re not ſuch peremptory deciſions, and ſo remote inferences heaped one vpon an other) that howeuer there ſeemeth to be a pretty connexion in all I haue ſaid, and an appearance of a ſequele betweene the principles I haue taken, and the concluſions I haue deduced out of them; Yet, that I haue driuen them too farre; and that in ſo perplexed and long a diſcourſe, there may eaſily haue ſlided in ſome litle errors or æquiuocations in ſundry iointes of it, which in the laſt concluſion may haue cauſed an enormous miſtake, though euery one of them in particular were almoſt an imperceptible one: And therefore, that theſe are rather pretty dreames, hanging handſomely together, of a much thinking and melancholike man; then reall and ſolide truths. And att beſt, they will looke admiringly vpon them, as vpon vnconceiuable expreſſions; without being att all moued and affected by them. But whatſoeuer others may thinke,

who like vnto ill husbandes do looke but vpon the totall ſummes of the accountes their Stewardes bring them in, without examining the particulars from whence they grow; I am ſure your Lordship will exactly weigh the reaſons, vpon which I ground this bold and far-re-reaching concluſion; And when you haue done ſo, I doubt not but you will find in it the ſame fault that I do; namely, that my expreſſions arriue not to ſett out the reall vaſtneſſe of the thing I ſpeake of. To the reaſons I haue brought, I could haue added many more in confirmation of this great truth: for, the arguments I haue produced, are but a few, and that firſt occurred in the heate of writing, among the many that I might haue employed, if I would haue aymed att making a large and complete treatiſe vpon this ſubiect. But my ayme, is, onely to giue your Lordship hintes of the chiefe pointes that I vould recommend to your conſideration; as

relying more vpon what your owne ſtrong diſcourſe will ſuggeſt vnto you vpon ſuch important conſiderations, after your thoughtes are once wakened to attend to them; then vpon any thing I ſhould be able to ſay. I pretend but to ſpring the game for you: And then, if you like what riſeth, you will fly it home.

If an Apologie for the faintneſſe of my expreſſions, was euer needfull; certainly it is now moſt neceſſary, for what I ſhall ſay in this Chapter; Where I labour vnder ſuch a Weight of matter, that I want language to expreſſe but a bare ſhaddow of it. Yet I muſt not do as the great painter did, who hauing expreſſed as much paſſion as he could in the lookes of the by-ſtanders att Iphigenia's Sacrifice, drew a veyle ouer her fathers face; becauſe he found his art too weake, to deſcribe ſo great a ſorrow as his; And ſo left it to the ſpectators thoughts, to conceiue what a one that might be. For if

I ſay nothing more then I haue done, of a ſeparated ſoules bliſſe or woe: It may ſeeme that I haue no apprehenſion or ſuſpition of any thing, beyond what I haue already layed groundes for. And on the other ſide, if I ſhould go about to delineate ſcrupulouſly that which is the title of this Chapter; I ſhould, not onely miſſe of diſplaying to your Lordship the redundant light that shineth in this next region; but ſtrike my ſelfe blind with looking too fixedly vpon it. I will then goe a middle way, And ſay enough to make you ſee, how that meruailous exuberance of good or bad I haue shewed doth betyde a ſeparated ſoule, is nothing, (not neere ſo much as an Atome to the whole world) in reſpect of what will be her lotte in order to the ſeeing of God Almighty: And yet, not engulfe my ſelfe farre in this vaſt ocean, that hath no ſhore on any ſide.

It is euident, out of what hath beene

beene already ſayed; that, ſeeing this life is ſhort, our acts in it meane, and our ſcience in it very limited and narrow: And that on the contrary ſide, the next life is æternall, a ſoules acts in it wonderfull high, and her ſcience immenſe: The great and finall happineſſe of man, is not to be expected in this life, but in the next. It is euident alſo, that our hapineſſe being to be reſpited till the next life, where we ſhall haue no ſenſes to reape pleaſures by; it can not conſiſt in ſenſuall pleaſures: And conſequently, that it muſt conſiſt in the operations of the ſoule; which are nothing but knowledge, & what reſulteth out of that. Now, all knowledge, is either of effects, or of cauſes. Of the firſt kind, is all that knowledge of a ſeparated ſoule which we haue bin hitherto diſcourſing of: for, all the obiects of it, are compriſed vnder the generall head of Creatures. The knowledge of their Creator, can not be doubted to be as much ſuperior to that, as

the nature and excellency of ſuch a cauſe, is ſuperior to the effect that proceedeth from it. And conſidering the dignity of ſo Almighty and infinite a cauſe, as God, the Creator of all thinges; a naturall man may reaſonably queſtion whither a ſeparated ſoule (who is but a particular and limited creature) be capable of arriuing to ſee (that is, to know) this all comprehending and infinitely all exceeding cauſe. He may ſoone be reſolued of his doubt, if he reflect vpon the courſe of nature in wafting man kinde to his long home: for doing ſo, he will ſee how this life is a perpetuall progreſſe in bettering, (or, deſigned to the bettering) of the ſoule's knowledge in the next life; as being the end of humane nature, and the onely thing that can giue it reſt and ſatisfaction. He will alſo ſee, that as in the next life there is an infinite encreaſe of knowledge: ſo muſt there be alſo, an infinite encreaſe of the deſire to ſee the

cauſe of thoſe infinite effects which we ſhall then ſee & admire; Experience telling vs, that a cleare and lightſome vnderſtanding, is euer vnquiett and thirſting to ſee the cauſe of the effect he taketh content in; And reaſon likewiſe abetting it, by ſhewing how it is impoſſible to ſee an effect perfectly, if one pierce not into the cauſe of it; for vnleſſe he do ſo, he would not know why the effect is. So that it is euident, the whole courſe of nature, driueth to promote and aduance in vs the deſire of ſeeing the Vniuerſall cauſe of the infinite effects that a ſeparated ſoule ſhall ſee. And conſequently, the deſire of ſeeing God our creatour, is planted and engrafted in man by the intention of nature. What is ſo; is impoſſible to be fruſtraneous, and totally without effect; but of neceſſity will be fulfilled in ſome. For, Nature, is nothing elſe, but the rules that the infinite wiſedome and goodneſſe of God hath alotted to all

creatures. And it would not agree with thoſe attributes, to preſcribe any of them a periode, vnto which none of their kinde should euer arriue. Well may thoſe be plantethin the Sphere of contigency, miſcarry in ſundry indiuiduals; ſince it is the nature of contingency, that ſome should miſcarry, whiles others arriue to their periode. But if all should miſcarry, and none ſucceede; it would no longer be contingency, but impoſſibility: and it might be concluded, that nature were vnduely moulded; and the meanes to bring it to its end, vnwiſely ordered. And in our caſe, we might adde, malice and cruelty, to the imprudence: ſince, by the courſe of our nature, we should be brought ineuitably to an eternity of miſery, by cauſing in vs a moſt vehement and moſt actife deſire of knowing and ſeeing that which we muſt neuer attaine to ſee. And the beſt men, that haue moſt cultiuated their ſoules according to the preſcriptions of

nature, would drinke deepeſt o this bitter cuppe of gall and miſery. Therefore, we may ſettle it for a firme and certaine truth, that ſome ſoules ſhall arriue to ſee, (that is, to know) God, the Vniuerſall cauſe of all thinges; as already I haue proued, that all ſoules ſhall arriue to know all thinges elſe. Lett vs now compare theſe two knowledges, one with an other; and examine which of them is the greater and the more excellent. We are ſure that God is an vnderſtanding: And conſequently, he knoweth what he is to do, before he doth it. Whence followeth, that he being the cauſe and maker of all creatures, he vnderſtandeth and knoweth them all. Therefore, he that ſhould haue that great regiſter diſplayed to him to reade the contents of it, would find all creatures comprehended in it. And to know them there, is ſo much nobler, then to know them in themſelues; by how much nobler and excellen-

ter, they muſt neceſſarily be in that great vnity and identity which they haue in him, then in their owne multiplicity and diſperſion. Vnto which we may adde, the infinite exceſſe of thinges, which he could, but neuer will, make; ouer thoſe he hath or shall haue made. And then we can not doubt, but that the knowledge of God, muſt be farre beyond the knowledge of all creatures. But when beſides this knowing of all creatures in God, we shall putt into the ſcale to it the knowledge of God in his owne nature and Eſſence; the other ſcale wherein is the knowledge of creatures in themſelues, will not onely become light beyondall proportion, but will vanish out of ſight; like a candle, that though it giue light enough to make a whole chamber luminous in the night, diſſappeareth (euen whiles it burneth) if you ſett it in the beames of the noone day ſunne. They who vnderſtand Metaphyſikes, will contemplate

how the nature of Exiſtence, is of a pitch incomparably aboue that of Eſſence. For Eſſences are but poſſibilities; dead notions; till Exiſtence come to enliuen and to actuate them. After which they are ſtill defectible. For they carry alwayes with them a capacity of being diuided from their Exiſtence; which if it happen, they preſently fall backe to their inuiſible Chaos. But Exiſtence can neuer fade. The nature of it, is, to *Be*; and conſequently, to exclude *not Beeing*. It dwelleth in ſo high a region, as nothing can arriue thither, but whom It eleuateth vp to it ſelfe. Here, God hath his habitation. But I correct my ſelfe: this is improperly ſaid; as though God, had his place among other thinges, likewiſe ranked there. He endureth no companion. He filleth the whole region. All of it belongeth to him ſingly. He alone poſſeſſeth it all. And therefore it followeth, that a ſoule raiſed vp to the knowledge and ſight of him, muſt needes be infinitely

more noble and more Excellent, then an other that hath but the Eſſences of thinges drawne into her by the knowledge of them. If then, theſe two knowledges, that of God, and that of creatures, could not agree together; but, that to acquire the one, the other muſt be deſerted; There can be no doubt, but that the knowledge of creatures, ought to be abandonned for the ſight of him. For it is euident, that the happineſſe which a ſoule muſt neceſſarily enioy by ſeeing of him; is as much beyond that happineſſe which we haue formerly deſcribed, reſulting out of the vaſt knowledge which a ſoule hath in the next life; as that knowledge, exceedeth the tryfling knowledge mankinde enioyeth in this world. But this is not the caſe. Theſe knowledges are not incompoſſible. For it is the nature of knowledge, to be ſo farre from ones hindering an other; that there is none, but of its nature, induceth and perfecteth ſome other knowledge

ledge. And accordingly, the knowledge of Almighty God encreaſeth the knowledge of creatures; ſhewing vs why they are; and ſolidating their knowledge, vpon the vnshakable foundation of Gods knowledge. And conſequently, the more that a ſoule shall know God; the more firme and the more ſtrong will be the knowledge she shall haue of creatures. Neuertheleſſe, when we conſider that God is an obiect, whoſe admirableneſſe is æquall to his owne vnderſtanding: that is, exceeding ours, beyond what is poſſible to be conceiued: we muſt conclude, that when a created vnderſtanding enioyeth the knowledge and ſight of him, it can not chooſe but be ſo employed and taken vp by that ſight, as notwithſtanding the vehement deſire which we haue shewed it hath to ſee it, yet it hath not deſire enough to cleaue and apply it ſelfe to that obiect: much leſſe, hath it any left for other thinges, but meerely as it is carried

on by the ſight of God. And conſequently, it mattereth not to a ſoule that ſeeth God, whither she ſee any thing elſe or no: but she is entirely contented and ouerwhelmed with the greatneſſe of that fundamentall ſight. And although she knoweth and eſtimeth to the full the true worth of the ſight of other thinges: Yet she is ſo drowned and abſorbed in the ſight of God (which ſo infinitely exceedeth the other) that she is no more affected with it, then a man would be with the hauing of that which is but a pure medium to helpe him to compaſſe ſome end or good he deſireth for its owne ſake. As for example; when a ſicke man drinketh a potion to recouer his health; if the phyſike be ſuch as hath no pleſantneſſe, (but rather the contrary) in its taſt; he valueth it not att all for its owne ſake, but onely as it is a meanes to procure him health. And ſo, the ſoule that ſeeth God, accepteth of the ſight of all creatures, as a

meere conſequent and appendix to the ſight of God. Thus we ſee clearely, that in this compoſition of theſe two knowledges; the whole of both, is compriſed in that which is the principall; And by it, is all the pleaſure, and in it, all the good of them both. And conſequently; God and the ſight of him, is the true bliſſe of man; the ſole end for which he was created; the periode whereunto nature driueth, in all her courſe concerning him; and which once attained, he is quiett, entirely contented, and can wish for no more.

On the contrary ſide; If a ſeparated ſoule do faile of the ſight of God, she cannot chooſe but know, that all this we haue declared is true; And the euidence of it, will be confirmed to her by all the immenſe knowledge she shall haue in the next world: And conſequently, she muſt needes be vnſpeakably ortured by this vnhappy loſſe; and, as it were, gnash her teeth and

gnaw her owne bowels, for remorſe, ſhame, and indignation. And thus, the miſery or happineſſe of a ſeparated ſoule; by the interuening of God into the account, cometh to be raiſed and ſwelled aboue what in the laſt Chapter I declared of them, as much as what is infinite exceedeth the leaſt parcell of Quantity; Æternity, time; ſelfe-Exiſtence, defectible natures; And in a word, God, creatures.

I am perſuaded that after all this, your Lordship will not cenſure me of being niggardly in allowing pleaſure or paine to ſoules in the next world. Yet ſeeing that the compoſition of man, includeth a body, aswell as a ſoule: I conceiue you will not be diſpleaſed, if I adde a word or two concerning the pleaſures of ſenſe, which will belong to a happy ſoule: the contrary whereof, will be the lotte of an vnhappy one; And therefore what I ſhall ſay of the one, will require but turning ouer the leafe to referre it to the

other. It is very true, a ſeparated ſoule is capable of no other pleaſure, then ſuch as belongeth to a ſoule: Yet if we looke well into the matter, we ſhall finde, that this pleaſure of the ſoule compriſeth alſo all the pleaſures of the ſenſes. For this end, your Lordship may pleaſe to remember, how I haue formerly shewed that in the ſenſuall pleaſures which a man enioyeth in this life, it is not his ſenſes that are affected with them. For, all pleaſure dependeth of knowledge: And therefore, whereſoeuer we meete with expreſſions or ſemblances of pleaſure, that are not accompanyed with knowledge; we may truly ſay, they are but like ſuch expreſſions and imitations of life, as cunning artificers bring to paſſe by wheeles and engines encloſed in a boxe, whereby the ſtatue of a man, of a beaſt, of a bird, of a fish, or of a fly, is made to imitate the naturall motion of the creature it repreſenteth. But our

ſenſes are not endewed with knowledge, as hath beene explicated: Therefore the pleaſure which they conuey vnto vs, can not reſide in them; but belongeth onely to that part of vs, where knowledge is; that is, to our ſoule: And in truth is nothing elſe but the very pleaſure of knowledge. Hence it followeth, that ſince in the next life we haue all knowledge; and conſequently all knowledge gotten by ſenſe; we muſt haue there, alſo all pleaſure of ſenſe. So that we shall haue there by our naturall knowledge, all pleaſure, both of ſenſe and of vnderſtanding. Now, becauſe the ſight of God comprehendeth in it ſelfe, all pleaſure of vnderſtanding; it followeth, that in it alone is compriſed all pleaſure of ſenſe, and of vnderſtanding, together with that pleaſure which is proper to the ſight of God. Which in ſumme, is a collection of all good, in an act that of its owne nature is vnperishable. And ſo it is euident, the

ſight of God, is, true and compleate hapineſſe; including in it ſelfe, all that a man can deſire; without feare of euer looſing it: And therefore, perfectly quieteth the minde that enioyeth it, for all Æternity.

I haue ſaid vnperishable; not onely, as the ſoule her ſelfe and her acts, are naturaly vnchangeable: but, out of the ſpeciality and propriety of this very act of ſeeing God. For, God of his owne Nature, actuating all thinges that haue Potentiality to him; and the ſoule, being by Loue a potentiality to God; It followeth, that as long as she loueth him, he can not forbeare the actuating of her; which is, the being her Bliſſe. And on the other ſide; his actuating of her, being her ſeeing that he is all her good; she can not ceaſe from louing him, as long as he doth not ceaſe from actuating her. So that, his actuation, being neceſſitated by her louing him; and her louing

him, being neceſſitated by his actuating of her; the conjunction is made vnſeparable, by the very Eſſences of the two partes. Beſides this, if we conſider how diuines teach vs, that our beatificall viſion is made by the immediate conjun- of God Almighty his Eſſence to our vnderſtanding; and that by conſequence, his being vnderſtood by him ſelfe, becometh the Being of our ſoule as it vnderſtandeth him: And, that his being vnderſtood by himſelfe, is his very Æternity: We shall find, that Eternity it ſelfe, is the duration of our ſoule, as she is the vnderſtanding or ſeeing of him. Now, if Eternity be the duration of our bliſſe; who can queſtion whither it be vnperishable, or no? See (My Lord) what a pitch we are arriued vnto, to participate the very God-head it ſelfe, in its owne Eternity! Is not what the Apoſtle hath told vs, perfectly true, *Quod, oculus non vidit, nec auris audiuit, nec in cor hominis aſcendit,*

quæ præparauit Deus ijs qui diligunt illum ?

THE XI. CHAPTER.

That there is a certaine methode and way to bring mankind to Beatitude. And of the neceſsity of knowing it.

WHat hath beene hither to ſaid; bauing euinced the Immortality of the ſoule; and pointed att the pleaſures of a happy one when she is out of the body, together with the miſeries of an vnhappy one ; and glanced in groſſe, att the different wayes which leade to theſe ſo different ſtates ; And ſettled this great Principle, That Beatitude is not to be looked for in this world, but in the next : It can not be doubted, but that when an vnderſtanding man shall haue well conſidered all this, his heart will be ſett on fire to learne which

is the ſtraight, and beaten way, that may leade him with ſecurity to ſo great a good, intended him by God and Nature. For he can not chooſe but ſee, that no good of this world can be paragoned to that bliſſe; as alſo, that no action is worth the doing, that is not aymed att purchaſing that hoped and deſired Beatitude. But when to this he ſhall adde; that although he trauell not by deſigne in the oppoſite way, but that meerely through heedeleſſeneſſe or ignorance he do walke out of the vight way; all ſuch by-ſteppes do ſwarue his ſoule from her true good; and as farre as they aduance him not, ſo farre they preiudice him: He will then conclude, that the methode and courſe of arriuing to this ſupreme and ſole good; is not onely the worthieſt, the nobleſt, and the vſefulleſt art he can ſtudy: But that in very deed, all others are but fond and vaine miſſe-ſpendings of time; And that this onely, is the buſineſſe he is to employ him-

ſelfe a bout, with all his induſtry and application. He will be afraid of being ill directed: and will be ſolicitous to meete with a cleare and diſtinct rule that may inſtruct him how to treade boldly in euery ſteppe he is to make: And therefore will not be content with diſcerning in groſſe, that the entertaining of his thoughts and affections with Intellectuall goods, will make him happy; and that his ſettling them vpon ſenſuall ones, will bring him to a contrary condition: But ſeeing that theſe generals do branch out into numerous particulars, euery one of which requireth a particular diſſection, and proper motiues and inducements to embraſe or auoyde them; He will be anxious and ſcrupulous in ſeeking out the greateſt certitude and infallibility that man's nature and the courſe of ſecond cauſes can afford him, to be right in this pointe. In the meane time, during ſuch his attentiue and earneſt inquiry, he will haue the comfort of being

ſecure that *there is ſuch an art*: And that it is not like the ſpecious vndertakinges (for example) of thoſe who pretend to an vniuerſall ſcience, or Matrice tongue, whereby one may learne all others in very short time; which haue no ſubſiſtance, but in credulous perſons ayry fanſies. For he who is able to weigh in his thoughts the progreſſe of Gods prouidence in his wayes to compaſſe his deſired Endes vpon this world; can not doubt but that he muſt haue framed ſtronger engines to bring about the ſaluation of mankinde, then for any other deſigne that he hath ſett on foote within our reach and kenning: not onely, as being the nobleſt end of all others; but euen that, vnto which the whole courſe of nature tendeth, and for which all this world that we conuerſe with is made. And therefore he will conclude, that the ſecurity of obtaining the true meanes to gaine Beatitude, muſt be as great (if not greater) then the ſecurity of mens

liuing peaceably and happily togeſther vnder the reglement of ciuill and politicke conſtitutions, or what other ſecurity ſoeuer is in the gouernement of man's life. And conſequently, if he compare the certitude belonging to the ſcience which is to bring mankinde to Beatitude, with the certitude of ſuch knowledges or rules as gouerne the arts that are vſuall among men, (as Agriculture, Military diſcipline, the art of Nauigation, and all ſortes of handicraftes and trades) he will looke for att the leaſt as great in this ſcience, if not greater. But all theſe ſortes of men, being taught by continuall experience, that when they worke according tho the rules of their art, the effect ſucceedeth to their wish; are ſo ſecure in their ſeuerall wayes, that they can not admitt any doubt of the certainty and truth of their rules. Wee haue reaſon therefore to expect in this art of gouerning our actions in order to Beati-

tude, att the leaſt ſuch a ſecurity as may æqualiſe the ſecurity ſpringing from experience that is in trades and manufactures. And this is by ſo much the more neceſſary, by how much the ſubiect of this art, hath greater difficulties then the ſubiects of others arts. Firſt, becauſe this is both ſpeculatiue and practicall; whereas others are onely practicall. In others, euery man deſireth to do well: In this, for the moſt part, paſſions and intereſts make men deſire not to do well. In others, no man doubteth of his rules; and all his labour is onely to apply them rightly: But in this art, there is difficulty, aswell to vnderſtand and belieue the principles of it; as to apply them to our life when we know them. In other arts, a Maſter or teacher is readily mett with, and the manner to acquire them is obuious: But in this, a maine difficulty is the ſeeking and diſcerning of a ight teacher. Laſtly, other arts containe but ſome one part of a

mans action and life; But this, comprehendeth all our whole life; and principally, the higheſt partes of it. I may therefore conclude, that the art of comming to Beatitude (which we call *Religion*) is the higheſt, the ampleſt, and the neceſſarieſt of all Artes whatſoeuer. The higheſt; becauſe the ſcope of it is to gaine Beatitude: which is our chiefe End; and vpon which, all that is otherwiſe pleaſing to vs ought to depend. The ampleſt; becauſe in the vſe and application of it, it extendeth to all our actions. And the moſt neceſſary; becauſe if he be not inſtructed in it, he will infallibly miſcary and perish. For as a man that is no Architect or Muſician, and hath not learned how to build a houſe or to play a leſſon on the lute; though he will not be blamed for his ignorance in thoſe arts, (which happily is not through his owne default; but by ſome impoſſibility of getting inſtructions in them) yet if the one goe to build himſelfe an

habitation, or the other to touch a lute, they will not effect what they ayme att: But the diſordely machine of ſtones and timber of the firſt's imitation of a houſe, will fall vpon his head; and the ſeconds inconcerted ſtrokes and ſtoppes, will annoy his owne and his hearers eares. In like manner, if a man haue not the true knowledge of liuing ſo as to attaine Beatitude; Although he be not blamed for incredulity, if it were neuer duely propoſed vnto him; yet he shall faile of obtaining the bliſſe that followeth out of a well ordered life, and shall inherit in the next world all thoſe tormentes and miſeries which I haue expreſſed and shewed to be the effects and ſequele of a diſordered life in this. And therefore, no excuſe ſerueth a man's turne for his ignorance in this art: which is ſo abſolutely neceſſary, that without it (be the cauſe what it will) he is loſt and ruined for euer.

THE

THE XII. CHAPTER.

How the methode and ſcience of attaining to Beatitude (which is true Religion) is to be learned. And that it is not come into the world by humane reaſon or inuention.

THE art then of well liuing, or Religion, being a certaine and a diffuſed ſcience, reaching to euery action of a man's life, as is deliuered; Our next inquiry muſt be, how to compaſſe the knowledge of it. It is euident that there can be but two wayes to arriue vnto it; namely, Either by ones owne Inuention, or elſe by an others inſtruction: There being no third way of acquiring any ſcience. For, a man cometh vnto it, either by driuing of conſequences out of knowledges that are euident as ſoone as they are propoſed (ſuch

like as are the Axiomes, vpon which Mathematicians do build their demonſtrations) And this is the courſe of Inuention: or elſe, he muſt be beholding to ſome other man who knoweth that ſcience, for inſtructing him init. And from ſucha one, he may deriue his knowledge in two different manners: The firſt, when he that is poſſeded of a truth, doth ſo explicate it and all belonging to it, that att the laſt the learner ſeeth the truth it ſelfe, and comprehendeth all the reaſons of it, as fully as his inſtructour doth; And ſo, though he be beholding to him for begetting ſuch ſcience in him; yet now he hath no longer neede of him, but is as ſtrong in it as he. And the gaining of knowledge in this manner, may be conceiued to ſauour in ſome ſort of Inuention, as well as of diſcipline. But the ſecond, belongeth purely to diſcipline; As when the learner arriueth no higher then barely to vnderſtand what his teacher ſayth; and att the furtheſt, to

haue ſome morall likelyhood that it is true; but att the head, relyeth vpon his teacher, as one who he is certainly perſuaded can neither be ignorant of the truth he deliuereth, nor can lye and deceiue his diſciple. For if either of theſe faile, the diſciple can haue no certainty or rationall confidence of the ttuth deliuered him: And then conſequently, in our preſent caſe of Religion, he will want that quiet, that ſecurity, & that content of hart, which accompanyeth ones belieuing that he is in the right way of obtaining the happineſſe he aymeth att.

Now to apply vnto the knowledge of Religion, theſe two wayes of attaining any ſcience, Inuention and diſcipline: I will begin with examining whither it may reaſonably be hoped, that humane Inuention could diſcouer it, or no. Some may thinke the negatiue; becauſe in the myſteries of it there are no lines of demonſtration; that is, no ſuch connexion of them vnto principles

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euident to vs by nature, that out of them any man, be he neuer ſo knowing, or euen an Angell, could deduce them. To diſcuſſe this in particular, were to enter vpon all the ſeuerall myſteries of our faith; and ſhew, how they either are, or are not, connexed with reaſon: which, beſides that it were two long a worke for my deſigned breuity, would be too heauy a burthen for my weake ſhoulders; who am not ſo vaine as to pretend to any more of diuinity then what is neceſſary for euery rationall man to ſettle him in a right courſe; which amounteth to no more, then to the finding of a certain and infallible guide to carry him ſafely to the end of this important iorney; But if your Lordship deſire to ſatisfy your ſelfe herein, giue me leaue referre you to Maiſter Whites Dialogues (vnder the name of Rushworth) of the Iudgement of common ſenſe in choice of Religion, and to the ſame author's ſacred Inſtitutions newly come a broad into

the world; in which learned workes you will find abundant content. That therefore which I shall note vpon this occaſion, is, That howeuer there may be in the myſteries themſelues, ſufficient groundes to build demonſtrations vpon; yet in regard of vs, there is no hope that we should be able to penetrate into them, without hauing firſt learned them otherwiſe. For our Nature is ſo encumbred with materiall fantaſmes; and all that we ſpeake, or thinke, is deliuered in ſuch æquiuocall wordes; and aboue all, moſt men are ſo blinded by paſſions and ſo byaſſed by intereſts; and they meete with ſo litle to helpe them in this deſigne; that very few (and they neither, not till towards the end of their life) can be expected to make any progreſſe in ſo high an attempt. And therefore we may conclude, it is impoſſible, by inuention to reach the amplitude of thoſe myſteries which are neceſſary to be knowne, to bring mankinde to Bea-

titude; the doing whereof, is the ſcope of that art or ſcience which we call Religion. Vnto which determination, drawne out of mature conſidering of the cauſes, no ſmall corroboration is added by experience, ſhewing vs effectiuely how litle mankinde had aduanced herein during the long ſpace of 4. or 5, thouſand yeares, that nature had continued from the beginning of the world, till our Sauiours coming to teach it vs completely. For if we looke vpon what the learned Grecians deliuered to their Roman Maſters, att the time when the ouergrowne wealth of Rome was propoſed vnto them to fire their wittes to find out what Beatitude was (which was the learnedeſt age, the moſt abounding with great men, and the laſt, in which their ſtudies were employed on that ſubiect; and in a great meaſure sharpened by the oppoſition of Chriſtianity, then beginning to grow into the world) we ſhall finde that their attempts ne-

uer reached with any ſteadineſſe beyond this life. For although ſome of them diſcourſed that the ſoule was Immortall; Yet they held it rather as a plauſible opinion, then as a ſolide truth whereon men should ground their actions, and should gouerne their liues here by it. As your Lordship (if you be deſirous to ſatisfy your ſelfe in this particular) may find in Lucretius, Tully, Seneca, Epitectus, Antoninus the Emperor, and ſeuerall others of that ſtraine; who preſcribing remedies againſt the feare of death, and making exhortations to vertue in this life; do neuer extend their motiues to any good obtainable in the next life. Which your Lordship may ſee proued att large in Lactantius; who purpoſely maketh it his taske to do ſo. For of thoſe Philoſofers who gueſſed furtheſt into the ſtate of the future world, none were euer able to frame any ſcantling of thediuerſity of the ſoulestreatement there, otherwiſe then by Gods ar-

bitrary distributing of reward, or inflicting of punishement: which way belongeth cleerely to beliefe, and not to science. So that, as farre as history can informe vs, Man's nature and witt did neuer attaine to the first principle of well liuing; which consisteth in considering what condition soules be in, after they are out of the body: so farre were they from hauing discouered true motiues to ballance our passions, and to sett vs in an euen way betweene the allurements of this world and the hopes of the next. And this is the good that we expect from Religion: whose scope is to raise and enflame the soules that are awake, and to rouse those that are asleepe in the dalliance of this world, to the esteeme and relishing of the happinesse they may enioy in the next.

THE

THE XIII. CHAPTER.

That religion hath not bin introduced into the world by one mans teaching an other. Nor by Angels inſtructing of men. But hath bin taught by God. And that Chriſtian Religion is the true one.

IT can not then be expected that Religion should be iutroduced among men by inuention or ſtrength of witt. It remaineth that it muſt be by diſcipline and by teaching. Whereof, ſeeing there are diuers kindes, or rather diuers kindes of teachers; our next enquiry shall be, att whoſe handes we are to looke for it. Our firſt poſition shall exclude one man's teaching an other. For, ſuppoſe that ſome one man should haue beaten out by long ſtudy the true way of attai-

ning to happineſſe (which neuertheleſſe, out of the former diſcourſe ſeemeth vnlikely, if not impoſſible) the way for him to deriue it to others, muſt be, either by demonſtrating it to them by reaſon, or by winning their beliefe to it becauſe he aſſureth them of it. But, demonſtration, in a matter ſo high and ſo difficult; can not be communicated to many: very few being capable of the ſtrength of ſuch a proofe, in much lower and eaſier ſubiects. It can not then be deriued to the people by any other meanes then by their relying vpon him that ſhould poſitiuely tell them what they are to beliue. But vpon him, they could not relye: for he being but a man they can not be aſſured whither what he ſayth be true or falſe: either, becauſe he might be deceiued himſelfe, and ſo deliuer them a falſhood for a truth: Or elſe, becauſe there might be conſiderations for him to propoſe it to them for true, although in his owne hart

he knew or doubted it to be falſe: As for example, either his owne particular profit, or glory, might preuaile with him to do ſo; or he might deceiue them for their benefit; keeping them by that meanes vnder good lawes, and to an obedience that should make them liue happily in this world. And from the ſuſpition of this latter, euen the beſt man that can be imagined (ſo he be no more but a man) can not be free. For, if he want power to introduce among men that which he iudgeth beſt for them; it may be doubted that he aymeth att bringing about his deſignes by art and cunning; according to the old parable, of ſowing the foxes skinne to the lyons to make it reach. Now if all theſe difficulties happen in the caſe of one man's propagating to the multitude this ſcience of Religion, which he is ſuppoſed to haue beaten out by his owne induſtry & learning: They would bona white leſſe, but rather more, when ſuch reuiuers and demonſtra-

tors should be many. And without their being many, it can not be conceiued how the generality of mankinde that is ſpread ſo wyde in place, an of ſo long durance in time, can be imbued with it. Adde to this, the much that halfe learned men, and halfe wittes, would obiect againſt Religion propoſed by ſuch as pretend to relye on it becauſe they haue demonſtration for it; which would be farre more plauſible to the vulgar of mankinde, then all that can be ſaid to ſolue thoſe obiections; conſidering the profoundeneſſe and ſubtility that can not choſe but be in ſuch a demonſtration, and the vngraſpableneſſe of the very Nature, and Eſſence of a ſeparated ſoule, which is the neceſſary entrance into it: So that ſuch men would giue ouer their inquiry and attention, before euer they aduance ſo farre as to weigh the reaſons whither or no a ſoule can be without a body; becauſe they can not conceiue what ſuch a ſoule is; And

yet this is the hinge & fundamentall pointe of all Religion. So that it can not be expected, that if there were no more efficacious meanes then this to perſuade mankinde; they ſhould by vertue of this onely, diſ-ſeiſe their harts from the goods of this world (to which the courſe of our nature gleweth them ſtrongly) and ſettle them vpon vnconceiuable ones in an other world; from whence they haue not experience of any ſoule that hath come to aſſure them thereof, and to informe them what kind of inhabitants they ſhall become there, when they arriue to the poſſeſſion of thoſe goods. We may then from this diſcourſe conclude, that for prudent men to receiue Religion in the way of beliefe, they will expect to haue it built vpon a ſtronger rocke then humane credit.

The next ſteppe aboue the degree of men, is the Sphere of ſpirits or of Angels. Among whom, ſeeing there be good ones, and bad ones; lett vs begin with conſidering

what we may expect in this caſe att the handes of theſe latter: And lett vs ſuppoſe them to conuerſe with men, by giuing them Oracles; as auncient ſtories do record of Apollo att Delphos, or of Iupiter Hammon in Lybia, and the like. Can any thing they ſhall declare and teach, be a ſufficient ground of beliefe? Surely, if euer any ſuch Oracle were animated with its ambitious ſoule (as is pretended) it is not reaſonable to expect that the ſpirit of lying ſhould alwayes ſpeake truth. And if he do not; one ſingle lye, taketh away the credit of all the Religion that he ſhould haue founded. For, if he can, and ſometimes do, lye: Whence may it be certaine that he doth not lye, when he deliuereth ſuch vnknowable thinges as thoſe which concerne the ſtate of the other world? And conſequently, if mankinde had no better ſecurity then this, the greateſt and higheſt deſigne of nature, would be loofely guarded, and more tot-

terring then euery meane trade. But lett vs conſider what ſecurity we may haue from good ſpirits. If ſuch ſhould denounce Religion to vs; it muſt be either in their owne names, that they would ſpeake; or it muſt be in Gods, as his Ambaſſadors. If in their owne names, what confidence can he to whom they ſpeake, haue, that they may not be aſwell of the tribe of lying ſpirits, as of the bleſſed Angels? If he aske them, whither there be not ſuch deceiuing ones, who were once their companions, and of the ſame nature as they; and are ſince become wicked and malitious; they will acknowledge there are, And then, what infallible markes can he haue to ſecure him, that theſe he conferreth with, may not be ſuch, though they ſtile themſelues Angels of light? And their very ſpeaking in their owne names, may iuſtly render them ſuſpected: for, if they were ſuch as they pretend to be; that is, out of danger of falling (as their mates

haue done) by hauing perpetuall ſight of the æternall verity; then, their very being ſuch, would reaſonably make a man expect that what they deliuer him of that verity and of the way to arriue to it, should rather be a meſſage from him that maketh them ſo ſtable and indefectible, then an inſtruction proceeding from their owne ſingle impulſe. And after all, if he do beleeue them to be of the happy ſort, and for that cauſe do giue credit to what they ſay; it is in effect vpon the ſcore of him that enlighteneth and ſtrenghteneth them, that he beleeueth them; And the ſpeaking of ſuch, is rather from him, then from themſelues. We may therefore conclude, that there neuer was, nor euer could, or can be, any true Religion among Gentiles or Idolaters, or amõg any, who do not profeſſe their beliefe hath its ſource from the true omnipotent God, the ſelfe-verity, and the ſpring-bonity. Nor can they pretend to ſuch certainty of rules for

bringing them to Beatitude, as experience sheweth accompanieth the rules of all trades and manufactures. All theſe then being excluded from all pretence to true Religion; and all created inſtructors, appearing of too meane credit to ſettle it in the world; It remaineth onely that we haue recourſe to God alone for this ſupreme bleſſing; And that we inquire what lawes and ordinances he hath giuen mankinde, to gouerne and direct them vntill the end of the world, that they may attaine to Beatitude. And we find no markes in ſtory of any, that with likelihood we may pitch vpon, beſides thoſe tree memorable lawes which haue ſucceeded one an other: to witt, The law of Nature; the written one; and the laſt, giuen by Chriſt. The firſt of theſe, can not be admitted now to any plea; the ſucceſſion of it being ſo interrupted, that no body can claime the inheritance of that faith; Nor doth any body know the ſeuerall con-

tents and articles of it, further then as ſome few of them may be ſuppoſed to be included in the written law; and by the ſucceſſion of them who profeſſe the written law, deriued in them and in Criſtians to our dayes. The Iewes can as litle pretend that the law which God giue them by Moſes, is the religion whereby the whole bulke of mankinde in all ages is to be ſaued. The very nature and eſſence of it, and all the maine circumſtances that accompany it, do contradict that clayme. For it is manifeſtly limited to ſelected perſons, to a determined time, and to a narrow place. Nor is it a good obiection, that ſome Proſelytes of other nations were allowed to be adioyned to the ſeed of Abraham, in participation of rites and ſacrifices: For ſuch an adiunction could not reach to whole nations; but contrariwiſe, ſome were expreſſely forbidden by name. And ſo, their law, was not a law for mankind; but onely for

the family of Abraham. Beſides, God himſelfe determined the land in which it should be practiſed: So as, ſacrifice could not be lawfully made, nor altars erected, in the way of their profeſſion, in any country but their owne: Which conuinceth that it was neuer intended for the ſaluation of mankinde, whoſe numerous progeny is diſperſed ouer the face of the whole earth. And it is cleare that their Meſſias was promiſed them att the end of the raigne of Dauids houſe, and before their diſperſion into the whole world: both which can not be denyed to haue bin long ſince performed: And conſequently, it was a temporary Religion, and not deſigned to laſt till the worlds end; which is a neceſſary propriety of that Religion, whereby all nations (that is, all mankinde) in all ages, are to obtaine Beatitude. It remaineth then, that Chriſtian Religion muſt neceſſarily be the law that God hath deſigned for the ſaluation of all

men, att all times, and in all places. Yet becauſe Mahomet pretendeth as well as Chriſtians, that his law is deriued from God; it will not be amiſſe to examine his clayme in a word or two. Firſt, there is a great diſparity betweene the Chriſtians and the Turkes law, in this; that Mahomet pretendeth not to be himſelfe God, as Chriſt doth; Nor that he had his law immediatly from God; but that it was ſent him by an Angell. Next, he alloweth Chriſt to haue bin a Prophet; and yet taxeth him of lying for hauing giuen himſelfe out to be God. By doing which, he maketh his owne doctrine rely but vpon a fallible authority. For ſince he obiecteth lying to Chriſt, whom he alloweth to be a Prophett: What ſecurity can one haue, that he who pretendeth not to be more, lyeth not aſwell as he? Againe; Chriſtians pretend a publicity of infinite miracles done by Chriſt, atteſting his God-head and the truth of his doctrine: Maho-

met and his ſectators, none; or att leaſt, ſuch as by their owne confeſſion are but obſcure ones. Laſtly; the abominations of Mahomets law, againſt both reaſon and nature; and a totall ſubmitting of the ſoule by it to bodily obiects; do euidently conuince, that the obſeruing it is not a promoting and perfecting of Nature towardes the great end of Beatitude, deduced in ſome of the former chapters; but a ſtrong and maine alienation from it: and conſequently, a peruerſion of humane nature, and a carrying of mankinde to eternall diſguſtes, miſeries, and torments.

THE XIV. CHAPTER.

How Chriſtes doctrine hath bin conueyed purely and entirely to ſucceeding ages. That puritanes and Proteſtants can not lay clayme vnto it.

IT is then onely the law of Chriſt, that can pretend with reaſon to the glorious title of a doctrine, able to bring a man ſecurely to his deſired happineſſe. Let vs then examine in the next place, if all they who giue themſelues out to be Chriſtians, do deſerue that name, and in reallity and effect be ſuch. No man will doubt, were he Iew or infidell, but that if Chriſt were God (as Chriſtians do profeſſe and beleiue) he was both able and willing to deliuer vnto his flocke the truth ſo neceſſary for them. Which once granted, it preſently appeareth, that Photinians, Arrians,

and all ſuch pretended Chriſtians as denyed Chriſt's being true God, had no Religion; they bringing downe the certainty of faith, to an authority vnder God; that is, to a fallible one, as I haue already shewed; and conſequently, ſubiect to falſity; and therefore not to be relyed vpon. For, Chriſt ſpoke not an others dictates, as Moſes did; nor in his difficulties, had recourſe to God, as to his lord or Maſter: but ſpoke as a maſter, and wrought as a Lord; as one, from, and of himſelfe: and who when he prayed to his father, did it for our example, not for his owne neceſſity; addreſſing himſelfe vnto him, by the name of father, not of maſter.

But ſetting a ſide all ſuch blaſphemours, as perſons no wayes conſiderable; lett vs looke backe vpon the maxime we haue formerly ſett downe; to witt, That he who liueth not well, that is, who doth not actually treade in the way which leadeth to Beatitude, ſhall not be

happy; how excuſable ſoeuer he be for not knowing the way or law: And then we ſhall ſtraight diſcouer, that it is not ſufficient for any man to ſay, he hath Chriſt's doctrine, and is willing to follow it; vnleſſe he be certainly aſſured that he haue it. Nor can he be ſure that he hath it, vnleſſe he haue ſome infallible meanes whereby to diſcerne it from falſe and pretended doctrines. This infallible meanes, can be none other, but the infallibility of the authority and conueyance, by which this doctrine cometh to him. If Chriſt, whom he beleeueth to be God, did ſpeake himſelfe immediatly to him; he would require no more: But ſeeing he is departed many ages ſince, from conuerſing with mankinde; we muſt inquire what infallible conueyance of his doctrine to vs, we may rely vpon. It is cleare, there can be but two wayes to performe that worke; the one, by writing; the other, by being handed downe from generation to generation; by the mouths

mouths of them who firſt and immediatly receiued it from Chriſt, and taught it to thoſe that they conuerſed with; who againe preached it all ouer the world; and they who learned it of them, taught it att their turne to thoſe who ſucceeded them; and ſo from generation to generation, and from age to age, is come downe to our preſent age. The vniuerſality which (euen in the very beginning, and whiles the doctrine was fresh in their memories that had it from its ſource) requiring a great time to the forgetting and extetminating of it euery where, it may be conceiued to haue bin conſerued pure and entire all this while, in ſome great part of the world. Third way, there is none: vnleſſe peraduenture we make a ſubdiuiſion of writinges; diſtinguiſhing betweene ſuch as came from the pennes of thoſe teachers who receiued what they write, immediatly from Chriſt; and whoſe wordes are authenticall and law; And ſuch

other writinges, as being composed by authors in succeeding ages, do informe vs what the Church hath held in all times. This sort of writers, may seeme to partake of both wayes; Of the first, as being writers: And of the second, as farre forth as they are in a manner a part of the handes through which Christe's doctrine hath bin conueyed vnto vs. These two wayes may seeme to haue bin shared betweene the french Caluinistes (among vs, called Puritans or Presbyterians) and the English Protestantes or common prayer men: But in reality, they haue them not. For, the Puritane, as soone as he hath highly and peremptorily pronounced, that nothing but scripture must be Iudge of Religion; and that the word of God, pure and alone, must gouerne; he presently makethyou a Catalogue of articles, which you must hold, if you will not be excommunicated, and cast out of his Church. And howeuer he may pretend that he desi-

ueth theſe articles out of ſcripture: yet, the wordes of them not being in the Scripture, he can not deny but that they are his owne collections and interpretations: So that if he miſſe in interpreting Gods written word; the ſenſe, aſwell as the wordes, will be his, and not the Scriptures. Now the Proteſtant; ſeeing the vnreaſonableneſſe of this proceeding, that a particular man or company ſhould oblige all men to receiue his interpretation of Scripture; thinketh to take a more plauſible courſe, by pretending to explicate Scripture by the fathers; eſpecially, by the fathers of the primitiue ages. But this ſeemeth to me more irrationall then the puritanes proceeding. For, firſt, he goeth againſt his owne principle, by appealing to the fathers after hauing proteſted againſt all humane authority, as fallible. Secondly, he maketh himſelfe iudge which of the fathers are to be receiued; and when; and what of them to be reiected; and

how to be vnderſtood : And ſo draweth the queſtion , from the ſole booke of Scripture, to the infinite volumes of fathers. And laſtly ; that he may ſerue himſelfe of the fathers manner of expreſſions , iointly with his owne conceits and opinions, (ſo to boulſter out his fancyes with the ſemblance of their authority) he confoundeth his owne language with their manner of ſpeaking ; and neither vnderſtandeth himſelfe , nor (much leſſe) can make an other man vnderſtand what he ſayth. Like thoſe commentors of Ariſtotle and S. Thomas; who not being bold enough to deny their authority, which hath taken ſo deepe rootes in all the ſchooles of Chriſtendome; do render their doctrine, and themſelues , vnintelligible, by their wreſted and confuſed interpretations. Yet I deny not , but that a right Proteſtant , is in many pointes neerer truth then the Presbyterian. For , his reading of the fathers , and his allowing them ſome kind of eſti-

mation; can not chooſe but worke ſome good effect in his minde. But that which I complaine of him for, is, that the rule he pretendeth, (as he vſeth it) is more intricate then the Presbyterians; and his diſcourſe, is more ambigous and confuſed, by his counterfeiting to hold with the fathers, when in truth he renounceth them.

THE XV. CHAPTER.

A further conſideration, of the inſufficiency and vnreaſonableneſſe, of the late Proteſtants proceeding, in point of Religion.

TRVLY it ſeemeth to me ſo euident, that neither of theſe haue any rule of Chriſtianity; as I haue oftentimes wondered when I haue heard ſome men (in other thinges, appearing to be prudent)

ſay in earneſt that they beleeue they haue one, and grow warme in their maintaining ſo much. For, there being but two channels whereby Chriſtes doctrine can deſcend to vs; writting; and deliuering from hand to hand; How can they pretend to Chriſtianity, who accept of neither of theſe? As for tradition by handes; they clearely defy it. And as for Scripture; If they take that for their rule, why do they binde men to opinions that can not be decided out of Scripture, but remaine ſtill diſputable after all is ſaid that can be vrged from thence? Well may they, in purſuance of their owne rule quarrell att ſuch as ſhall deny any point that is cleare and euident in Scripture: But to anathematiſe, and punish (when they haue the power) thoſe that produce out of Scripture as faire proofes for their opinions, as any thing they are able to bring againſt them; ſeemeth to me a great iniuſtice. Certainly, nothing can be more euident, then, that in all the

points which haue bin diſputed, out of Scripture alone, betweene Catholikes and them, now almoſt an 100. yeares; the textes produced by them, haue not att all inclined the ballance on their ſide; but rather (if I may be allowed to giue my verdict, in a caſe where I am intereſſed) it hath weighed notably on our ſide. And therefore, lett them pretend what they will; it is cleare, that Scripture is not their rule. As for the Proteſtantes pretending to the authority of the fathers in interpreting Scripture, the caſe is yet more cleare, if more may be. For, they ſticke not to ſay vpon euery occaſion, that the fathers erred; and that they might erre, both in common and in particular. So that, theirs is but like a cobwebbe lawne lining (of no ſubſtance or ſolidity) to the Nettelike cloke, wherewith the Presbyterians do endeauour to hide their foule play, when they recede from the rule which themſelues propoſe; and is looked through

att the firſt caſting of ones eyes vpon it: And in this regard, both their caſes are the very ſame. And to ſpeake plainely; the rule common to both theſe, and to all others, who propoſing Scripture for their rule, do afterwardes prefixe particular opinions to their Church; neither is, nor can be any other, then a heady pride and wilfulneſſe, to bind all other men to their, not knowledge, but gueſſing. Now if ſuch gueſſing, can be iudged a ſufficient meanes, for themſelues and others, to be aſſured of thoſe thinges, without the doing whereof mankinde muſt be eternally miſerable; theſe men may ptetend to Chriſtianity: But for my part, I can entertaine but a very meane eſtime of it. I know, ſeuerall of them are held for learned men: And that, not onely in their owne opinions, but by many others beſides. How iuſtly they deſerue that title, will appeare if we conſider, what true learning and knowledge in

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any ſcience, is. I take it, to be an aſſurance of the nature of the thinges that are treated of in that ſcience. Such, Mathematicians haue in their profeſſion; ſuch, the maſters of all the artes that belong to mans life. Such, Philoſophers haue, (or should pretend to haue; though ſome, vnworthy the name of Philoſophers, do content themſelues with probable opinions) and much more, deuines ought to haue ſuch aſſurãce of what concerneth their profeſſion; ſeeing, that any miſtake therein, expoſeth men to eternall ruine and miſery. Now the learning of theſe men that would paſſe for ſo great deuines, wherein doth it conſiſt? They pretend to no other, then to know what hath bin ſaid by others. Which others, are God and men; to witt, what hath bin ſayd by God in Scripture, and by men in their bookes. If they rightly vnderſtood all this, they might with reaſon haue a good conceipt of themſelues. But let vs examine how they behaue,

themſelues, in their proceeding with both theſe. As for Scriptures, I haue already touched how their penetrating into the ſenſe of them, is but a meere gueſſing: Yet were it ſomething, if they could make it appeare that they gueſſe fairely. I will allow them ſo much, if they can ſhew how any of their deuines in any one queſtion, hath faithfully paralleled the places of Scripture vſed to be brought on each ſide; and hath fairely compared and weighed them in the ballance, one againſt the other, and hath giuen each of them their full weight; and then hath pronounced an orderly ſentence, in this ſort; that by reaſon of plurality of places, propriety of wordes, efficacity of texts, and the like, the aduantage falleth to this ſide, rather then to that. If they should pretend they are able to do this (which I am ſure they neuer haue as yet performed) I would entreate them to ſhew me a learned logike of wordes, out of which they had extracted the

rules whereby the ſenſe of wordes may be pondered; and whereby one may be certaine when their ſenſe is demonſtratiuely knowne, and when but probably; and by what weights, one probability appeareth greater then an other? And after all this paines, I would tell them (and they can not deny it) that as long as both ſenſes are probable, the leſſe probable may peraduenture be the true one: And ſo, all their labour is loſt. But lett vs examine, if their learning be any greater in humane writers. The depth of it is, to boggle att any darke place of Hiſtory, or of fathers; and by it, perſuade ſuch men as are not conuerſant in antiquity, to frame a iudgement coutrary to the publicke practiſe of the Church of thoſe ages. As for example; what can be more publicke and nororious, then the ſucceſſion and authority of Bishops; then the being of Monkes and Nunnes; then the principality of the Bishop of Rome; then the practiſe of the Maſ-

ſe, Sacrements, and ceremonies; then the cuſtome of praying for the dead; then the vſe of Croſſes and of pictures? And euen for all theſe, they make it their labour (and for which they pretend the title of ſubtile and deepe ſchollers) to perſuade you, out of ſome not fully declared ſentence of a father, ſpeaking vpon the by, that there were no ſuch thinges as theſe in antiquity. Yet had our contryman more ſincerity then this; who in his tranſlation of S. Auguſtines confeſſions, profeſſeth plainely, that he had left out many thinges, becauſe S. Auguſtine had erred in them. So the Centuriſts, and Luther, and Caluin, and all Nouelliſts, whiles there remained any ingenuity among them, confeſſed that the opinions which they reiected, were auncient errors of the fathers. But now, all their learning conſiſteth in belying of antiquity, and in pinning a falſe maske vpon the venerable face of it. How then can men deſerue the name of lear-

ned, who take not the courſe to know any thing att all? Neuertheleſſe, they muſt paſſe for great deuines; when peraduenture they are all together ignorant, what diuinity is. Diuinity ſignifyeth a ſcience, that followeth out of faith or out of the diſcipline of ſaluation; in ſuch ſort as Euclides Elements do follow out of thedefinitions and axiomes, which he hath prefixed as groundes for his bookes, and that he hath ſuppoſed before them. In like manner, faith muſt be ſuppoſed to diuinity. But in ſteed of doing ſo, theſe men who terme themſelues deuines, do ſpend all their paines and employe all their ſchollerſhip, in oppoſing the receiued tenets of faith. So that they are ſuch eminent deuines, as he would be a Geometrician, who in ſteed of ſtudying throughly Euclides Elements, ſhould neuer goe beyond the firſt leafe; but ſhould buſy himſelfe many yeares, and write great volumes, to proue that his definitions are ill contriued, and

that his axiomes are falſe. And yet muſt ſuch ſeely æquiuocation, ſo puffe them vp, and perſuade their followers they are ſo great Clerkes, that all Antiquity, all the latter and preſent ages, and common ſenſe it ſelfe, muſt be deſerted to adhere to theſe learned Maſters. Whereas thoſe who are truly deuines, are beyond common Chriſtians, and do begin their ſcience and employment att the height of thoſe notions which belong to common Chriſtians: Whiles theſe, whom the Proteſtants terme deuines, do neuer attaine to the knowledge that the ſimpleſt Chriſtians are imbued with, by relying vpon tradition and vpon the authority of the Church. But enough of this: ſince it ſeemeth that God himſelfe hath taken it to his taske to ruine them whereſoeuer they appeared to haue power.

THE XVI. CHAPTER.

The Socinians and the Independents, excluded from hauing the true doctrine of Christ.

THESE two, being reiected from holding the rule of Scripture; (whatſoeuer they may pretend:) there remaine yet two other families who lay clayme to that rule; namely, the Independents, and the Socinians. Their difference, I take to be this: That the Independent acknowledgeth the booke we call the Bible, to be truly the word of God; and accordingly, maketh it his preciſe ſtudy to know what is ſayd in this booke. All that he findeth there, he holdeth for moſt certaine and holy. He bindeth others no further, then to acknowledge the letter; and to draw the beſt meaning out of it, that of themſelues

they are able. He accompteth all who do ſo, to be of his religion and communion, if they agree thereunto. If they will not communicate with him, he preſſeth them not: but if they will, he refuſeth them not. The Socinian his difference from the Independent, I take to be this: That he iudgeth the Bible to be the wiſeſt and moſt authenticall booke that euer was written; ſuch a one, as no other humane writting can conteſt with it; yet not ſuch a one, as no ſlippe or error might fall into it; euen in matters of importance, and concerning our ſaluation: And therefore, that where reaſon is abſolutely againſt it, he may leaue it; though for ciuility ſake, he will rather chooſe to putt a wrong gloſſe vpon it, then plainely refuſe it. Further, he thinketh it not fitting to moleſt anyman, who beareth the like reſpect to Scripture, and proceedeth modeſtly in his actions. Now it is cleare, that both of theſe do ſticke to the rule that they propoſe to

themſelues, for attaining the ſcience of Beatitude: And therefore their deficiency, is ſuch as humane nature is lyable vnto; It being incident to all men, to faile in their diſcourſe, when it is long. Whereas Proteſtants and Puritans do in the ſame breath contradict themſelues, and renounce the Principle which they lay for the firſt foundation of their receding from that Church they were borne in, and of their erecting a new one. This proceeding, no man can excuſe from barbarous impudence, and irrationality; or admitt them among the pretenders to religion, vpon the ſcore of Scripture; which att euery turne, they change into their owne fancy. But as I can not but prayſe the other two for going conſequently, and for ſticking to their rule and principle; and ſo eſteeme them to be rationall men and ſuch as deſerue to be diſcourſed with: So withall, I can not allow that they haue (properly ſpeaking) a religion among them, or ſuch a rule

asthey may ſecurelyrelyvpon forthe ſaluation of their ſoules : Eſpecially the Socinian; according to the explication that I haue here made of his teners ;which whither it agree, or not, to all thoſe who paſſe vnder the name of Socinians, I diſpute not; as not leuelling my arguments againſt Perſons but againſtopinions. Againſt theſe then that I haue related, I thus frame myoppoſitiõ. If itbe true(aslha ue already declared) that ignorance of the wayto Beatitude, will hinder vs from euer arriuing to it; And that it importeth not, whither it be by our ownedefault, or no, that we are ignorãtofit;(forbe it vpon what ſcore you will; and be wee as inculpable as you will ſuppoſe ; ſtill, the miſſing of the way, will bring vs to a wrong periode and end of our iorney; where we shall be plunged in infinite and eternall miſeries :) It followeth that it concerneth vs mainely, to prouide that we haue more ſecurety in this point, then in any other art or trade whatſoeuer that belongeth to

our well being in this life. Now whither the Socinian haue ſuch ſecurity or no, in the rule he relyeth vpon to bring him to Beatitude, is that which we are to examine. It can not be pretended that Scripture is his rule: for, ſeeing he ſuppoſeth Scripture to be fallible, and that vpon all occaſions he correcteth it by his diſcourſe; it is not Scripture, but his diſcourſe, and his reaſoning, that is his true and ſupreme rule: which is the cauſe that they, or ſome of their party, did denominate themſelues *Sanarations*, from right reaſon. Now, ſeeing that his diſcourſe, is not confirmed by ſenſible and reall effects abetting it; (as for example, by miracles, wrought to take away all doubts or ſcrupules againſt it; or by the returne of ſoules from the other world, to aſſure vs by their experience that we may ſafely rely vpon ſuch a rule, as hauing brought them to Beatitude) It can not be denyed, but that it hath no other ſtrength, then that

which it comprehendeth within it ſelfe & carrieth in its owne bowels. And this ſtrength, ought, to be no leſſe then certainty and vnanſwerableneſſe, if he intend that it ſhall ſettle all doubts and quiett all ſcruples in this affaire; where it importeth euery man to be cautious, inquiſitiue, doubtfull, and ſcrupulous to the vtmoſt. For if his diſcourſe be any degree vnder certaine, it is but probable: And euery point that is but probable, the contrary of it may peraduenture be true: And conſequently, all bare probable pointes, are either falſe, or elſe not knowne to be true; which is no better then falſe, to a man that can not be ſatisfyed with leſſe then an infallible rule to rely on. And therefore, the Socinian can not ſatisfy a reaſonable man, nor doth he giue a good account of himſelfe, vnleſſe he profeſſe to demonſtrate his aſſertions: And not onely thoſe aſſertions, wherein he contradicteth Scripture; but alſo thoſe, wherein he a-

greeth with it. For, ſeeing that Scripture hath with him no further authority, then of being probable; all that he gathereth there, can haue no more force then of being likewiſe probable; and conſequently, to make it infallible, he muſt ſupport and Corroborate it with a demonſtration. But what I haue already ſayd about demonſtration in this ſubiect, will coole our hopes in expecting any att the Socinians handes: Neither do they (as farre as I haue vnderſtood) pretend there vnto.

There remaineth then, onely the Independents rule of attaining to Beatitude, to be diſcuſſed. Whoſe proceeding is certainely more allowable, more iudicious, and more pious, then all the others that we haue hitherto looked vpon. For, he reſolueth his beliefe and groundeth his actions, wholy vpon him that can neither be deceiued himſelfe, nor deceiue others. In this matter, he is not content with any leſſe authority then Gods word. What he

findeth not in Scripture, belongeth not to his Creede. Infine, he giueth Scripture its true valew; and he ſticketh firmely to it, as his rule. But if all this may not ſuffice, vnleſſe he haue ſecurity of his tenets out of Scripture; I doubt he will haue a hard taske to proue them ſufficient for ſaluation. For, omitting that he muſt be aſſured of the texts of Scripture which he maketh vſe of; that thoſe very wordes which belong to his purpoſe, are in the originall; that the tranſlation he readeth, is not diſcrepant from the originall, in as much as concerneth his text (both which are impoſſible to be knowne by ordinary Sticklers in controuerſie) I am perſuaded it is much harder to demonſtrate out of wordes the way to Beatitude, then out of naturall principles; if not wholy impoſſible. The which, though I will not here diſpute, (it being largely handled by others; and particulary by Maiſter Rushworth in his ſecond Dialogue)

yet I will craue leaue to repreſent vnto your Lordship how the preiudice of continuall experience, for now att the leaſt 1600. yeares, is ſtrong againſt the Independents vndertaking. We know well, how during all this tract of time, there hath ſtill bin great diſputing out of Scripture againſt ſundry moſt important propoſitions; diuers of them directly impugning our Sauiour himſelfe and his dignity and Godhead; for the ſettling whereof in mens beliefes, it appeareth that a great part of the Scripture was written: And yet peraduenture, neuer a one of them was euer conuinced and beaten downe by Scripture, or by any other meanes then by Tradition and by the title of poſſeſſion of the contrary Doctrine. And shall not the conſideration of this ſucceſſe after ſo many attempts, make vs very doubtfull and afraid, that nothing can be conuinced out of ſole Scripture? I haue heard ſome, who haue employed their ſtudies to

be exact in the controuersy about Scriptures being the rule of faith, challenge others that haue pretended to haue greateſt skill and inſight in Scripture, to conuince out of it alone that there was but one God (a point wherein all Chriſtians agree) and they could neuer receiue ſatisfaction in it. The Eccleſiaſticall ſtories informe vs, how the Arrians defended their denying of our Sauiours diuinity, by pregnant texts of Scripture; and could not be conuinced, otherwiſe then by Tradition: And how it fared in like manner with ſundry others. The very nature of wordes; ſo ſubiect to diuerſes ſenſes and vnderſtandinges: The length of the Bible; whereby all ſortes of metaphores and improper manners of ſpeaking do occurre in it: And the reiterating of the ſame ſpeech, diuersly, in diuers occaſions: Do render it mainely ſuſpitious, that it is impoſſible to make a demonſtration for proofe and explication of the true meaning of any

any paſſage in it, which great wittes haue engaged themſelues in explicating a contrary way. And therefore, before a man can rationally rely vpon Scripture for a ſufficient rule to bring him to Beatitude; he muſt be ſatisfyed and conuinced, that there is a meanes, whereby he may certainely know what is the ſenſe of Scripture; and how he may compaſſe this meanes. For otherwiſe; all that he draweth out of Scripture, is vncertaine; And no leſſe vncertaine it is, whither what he hath drawne, be enough; or whither more be not neceſſary: And in a word, he remaineth on all handes in perpetuall incertitude.

THE XVII. CHAPTER.

That Tradition is the onely meanes of conueying Chriſtes doctrine to ſucceeding ages.

OF the two wayes of conueying Chriſtes doctrine to Mankinde in all ages (the firſt of which, is by writing; and that we haue bin hitherto reflecting vpon) there remaineth onely the latter (which is by handing it from one to an other) to be conſidered. A doctrine ſo conueyed, implying thereby that it hath beene in all ages; that is to ſay, in the vniuerſality of time; belongeth onely to Catholikes, to lay clayme vnto it; and onely they who do ſo, may properly be ſtiled Catholikes. Neither can it be obiected, that the Greekes may pretend it in ſuch pointes of faith as they differ in from thoſe that

liue in communion with the Roman See. Well may they, in matters of cuſtome: But theſe are of ſuch a nature, as they may haue bin different in ſeuerall places, euen att the very origine of them; without any inconueniency att all: And conſequently, in different places, there may haue continued different practiſes, euer ſince the Apoſtles time. But lett vs examine more particularly what aduantages or prerogatiues, this way of tranſmitting Chriſte's doctrine from hand to hand vntill our dayes, hath ouer the retriuing it in Scripture. Firſt, we ſhall find that it hath the prerogatiue of Poſſeſſion; All aduerſaries hauing found the Catholike Church (out of which they broke) in a quiett credulity that her doctrine was ſo deſcended from the Apoſtles. Next, it hath the prerogatiue of all the approbation and commendation that our fathers could giue it; by themſelues, by their lawes, by their rewardes and

punishements, and by whatſoeuer elſe they could inuent for the continuation of it. It hath a high ſtraine of teſtification, aboue all that is to be found in our titles to land, inheritances, legacies, bargaines, and all other morall tranſactions and concernements whatſoeuer. It hath the teſtimony of all our aduerſaries, to haue continued for a thouſand yeares, euen in thoſe poinctes wherein they diſſent from vs: but in all others wherein they agree with vs, they allow our continuance from the very origine of Chriſtianity. So as it can not be doubted, euen by our Aduerſaries confeſſion, but that this way is capable of bringing downe truths vnto vs vncorrupted. But aboue all, it hath the euidence of its fidelity in conueying to poſterity the doctrine of Saluation, by the connexion of one age to an other, Out of this maxime; *That it is impoſſible, all fathers through out the whole world, ſhould conſpire to deceiue their Children, in ſo im-*

portant an affaire. For, this Maxime doth ſo connect the knowledge of euery century, to what was knowne in the century immediatly preceding it; that it is impoſſible for any error to creepe in betweene them. And the maxime it ſelfe, is as euident as any that belongeth to Mathematikes: And ſo much more cleare then any of thoſe, as perpetuall dayly practiſe, beareth vs into the knowledge and continuall view of it. For, as no man could doubt but that the braines of that perſon were craſed, who conuerſing with marchants vpon the Exchange in London, and hearing them ſpeake dayly of Paris, and of moneyes they remitt thither, and of letters they receiue from thence; Should neuertheleſſe thinke confidently there were no ſuch towne as Paris, becauſe he was neuer there himſelfe: So, much more, would he be held for a mad man, that liuing in England, and conuerſing with all ſortes of people, rea-

ding their bookes of all kindes, hearing their ſermons, conſidering their lawes and the change of ſome particular ones in matter of Religion, and innumerable other particulars, which ſpeake manifeſtly how Catholike Religion had courſe in England before Henry the VIII. changed it; should neuertheleſſe deny it, becauſe he liued not in the time when that Religion was publikely profeſſed. For in this caſe, the number of witneſſes is farre greater then in the other. Now, when a motiue of humane prudence is ſo preualent a one, as to brand him with want of common ſenſe, who shoud not aſſent to what it induceth; It is a manifeſt ſigne of a conquering & axiomaticall euidence in the propoſition that he should ſo deny. And conſequently by this diſcourſe, (applying it to euery age ſince Chriſt's planting of his Church) the deſcent of Chriſtian or Catholike Religion from Chriſt, is as euident as any Geometricall demonſtration whatſoeuer.

One great prerogatiue more, I muſt not omitt, that Tradition hath aboue Scripture: which is, that Scripture is deliuered in preciſe and determinate wordes; whoſe ſenſe, is not vnderſtood: But Tradition, is deliuered in almoſt as many ſeuerall expreſſions, as there be ſeuerall perſons that deliuer it. So that, in Tradition, the ſenſe is conſtant, though the wordes be vncertaine: Whereas in a truth deliuered by writting; though the wordes be agreed vpon, yet the meaning of them is diſputed of. And therefore, ſeeing it is the meaning that we are to gouerne our actions by; and, that wordes, without meaning, are of noweight; It is euident, that Tradition is a rule, And that Scripture is none.

But why do I troble your Lordship with ſuch ſcrupulous balancing of theſe rules one againſt the other; ſince by my diſcourſe in excluding all former pretended rules, it appeareth euidently, that if Tradition be not the light which God hath

hung out to his Church, whereby to know true doctrine from falſe; when he ſent his Apoſtles to preach, and promiſed he would be with them (that is, with their preaching, or with their ſucceſſours in preaching) vntill the end of the world: We may truly conclude, there is no light or certainty to guide his Church by. Which is as much to ſay, as; that when he had built the world for men; and had fitted them with all thinges requiſite for their naturall and ciuill life in this world; he failed and miſtooke in the maine and chief end for which he had contriued all the reſt.

THE

THE XVIII. CHAPTER.

Againſt the opinion of ſome deuines that place Tradition in the conſent of fathers that haue written in their ſeuerall ages: and againſt ſome other opinions of particular deuines. As alſo againſt Naturaliſts and Socinians.

I am not ignorant, that among vs, there are ſome deuines, who as they acknowledge Tradition to be the rule of faith (for without doing ſo, they could not be ſtiled Catholikes) ſo, they place Tradition in the conſent of fathers through all ages. But I conceiue I ſhall not wrong them, if I ſay that in doing thus they conſider onely themſelues, and not the Church; which is compoſed of all ſortes and of all degrees,

of perſons; ſimple and wiſe; learned and vnlearned. For no man is ſo weake, as not to ſee, that it were a wilder arrant, to ſend the commonalty of Chriſtians, to the multitude of fathers for their faith; then to remitt them to the Scriptures. It can not be doubted, but that the rule of faith, muſt be ſomewhat within the peoples kenning. All ſortes of perſons are capable of diſcerning whither, or no, they are in the pur like communion of thoſe who profeſſe they haue receiued their doctrine by a continued ſequele of teachers ſucceeding one an other. But, for ſtudying of fathers, or Scripture; the vniuerſality of mankinde, wanteth for the moſt parte capacity, talents, and leiſure. And no ſmall difficulty will be added to this taske, by our aduerſaries endeauouring all they can, to caſt a miſt before mens eyes, and to obſcure what of it ſelfe is moſt cleare. I take therefore the conſent of fathers, to be a confirmation and a teſtimony to learned men, of the

Tradition that is deliuered by handes: but not to be the ſubſtance of Tradition: which of its nature might haue bin (if ſo God had pleaſed) and would haue maintained its vnshaken & inuincible force, though there had bin neither writinges of fathers, nor Scripture.

Others, ſeeme to thinke, that ſome points of faith are knowne by Tradition (or, as they call it by the vnwritten word) to witt, thoſe whereof they find not ſufficient prooſe in Scripture: but that for the maine ones, we are to haue recourſe to Scripture. Now for theſe, I admire att the looſeneſſe of their diſcourſe; when they allow Tradition to giue aſſurance of thoſe pointes which are the outmoſt, and which can not be knowne without the former; and yet will not haue the former to be knowne by the ſame Tradition. And therefore I imagine it is but a miſtake in their deliuering themſelues; and that their meaning is, that all pointes are knowne by Tradition;

but ſome, not onely by tradition, but by Scripture too. And it is euident, that all they who referre vnto Tradition, the knowing that Scripture is the word of God, and that this booke is the Canon of Scripture; muſt needes relate all certainty of faith, to Tradition; euen of what they thinke they demonſtrate out of Scripture.

Other deuines there be, who adde to Tradition, ſome power of reuealing new verities to the Church. But euen they themſelues do confeſſe that the knowing that there is ſuch a power, muſt rely finally vpon Tradition. And then, ſeeing it is a point not fully reſolued of among our ſelues; I conceiue it is not fitt to preſſe it vpon thoſe who haue yet reluctance in digeſting ſo much as is reſolued of, and is euidently true.

The reaſon why I haue mentioned theſe opinions of ſome particular deuines; is, becauſe I deſire that your Lordship should ſee that the

way wherein we walke, is not onely a plaine and a ſmooth one; but an eaſy one to be found out: which it would not appeare vnto you to be, if you should be obliged to what theſe men would impoſe. By my exceptions againſt which, aswell as out of what I haue formerly eſtabliſhed; I conceiue I may ſafely conclude, *That all Catholikes, do take Tradition, for the laſt rule, into which the certainty of all particular articles of faith, is to be reſolued.*

Now, were my taske performed; & Tradition ſett in the throne of commanding Chriſtian beliefe: Did not the Naturaliſt and the Socinian, with iointe forces, endeauour to poſſeſſe *Reaſon*, of that chaire: Alleaging, how *Reaſon* is the nature of man; the ſole power in him, that can giue conſent to any thing propoſed vnto him; And therefore, in ſpight of all I haue ſaid, muſt be Queene and commandereſſe both of his beliefe and of his actions. But when they obiect this to me, they do not conſider, how

I haue beene all this while labouring to do in effect that which they require. For, what hath all my diſcourſe leuelled att, but to shew, that reaſon obligeth vs to ground our beliefe vpon Tradition? So that I profeſſe Tradition hath no force to command beliefe, vnleſſe Reaſon tell vs ſo much; and as it were deliuer vs vp to Tradition. Reaſon telleth vs, it is fitt to beliue a knowing teacher or directour, in a matter wherein ones ſelfe is ignorant. She telleth vs, that she herſelfe hath not principles and meanes, without beleeuing ſome teacher, to giue vs certaine information of the ſtate of our ſoule in the next world, and of the wayes in this whereby Beatitude is to be obtained. She telleth vs, that Tradition hath deriued this knowledge from a Maſter who was well aſſured of it; and that she containeth within her ſelfe, a ſtrength of infallibility, to teach vs without miſtake what she learned of him. And So,

Reaſon concludeth, that we muſt harken to Tradition, and follow that rule. Elſe she renounceth vs, and proteſteth we goe againſt her ſentiments; that is, we do vnreaſonably. Will not this ſatisfy any man that profeſſeth to follow the conduct of Reaſon? Yet I will ſay more: Lett either Naturaliſt, or Socinian, produce true Reaſon (that is, demonſtration) againſt any thing that is atteſted by Tradition; and I will graunt him, we ought to leaue Tradition and follow reaſon. But, if reaſon could do that, it would not aſſert and maintaine the Infallibility of Tradition. It is not therefore true reaſon, but defectiue and Topicall eſſayes, and flashes of witt, which theſe men produce, and vpon which they rely: that is, vpon a broken reede; whoſe ſplinters (as the Scripture telleth vs) will gore them that leane vpon it.

Yet is it not my intention, by this diſcourſe to perſuade your Lordship that it is impoſſible, ſince the

myſteries of Chriſtian faith haue been reuealed, to reach by the helpe of faith vnto the demonſtration of reuealed truths; ſo as, nature be firſt duely vnderſtood. I know, the wordes in which our faith is deliuered, ought to be explicated by naturall definitions. I am ſure, that by the knowledge we haue of God by naturall ſciences (as, that he is a ſpirit; that he is immutable; and the like) we come to know, that many wordes and expreſſions deliuered of him in Scripture, are to be vnderſtood as ſpoken Metaphorically: And the like of angels, and all ſpirituall ſubſtances. I know that Man's freewill, is a natutall thing; and that by Philoſophy and Looking into our ſelues, we may come to vnderſtand what it is; and that out of the right or wrong explication of it, great and noble truths may be diſcouered; and, as great and foule errors incurred. I know, that termes, once rightly vnderſtood, muſt of neceſſity haue connexion among

themſelues; and that we do not looſe our vnderſtanding, as ſoone as we apply it to faith; And therefore, may make legitimate conſequences out of faith and naturall principles ioyned together. I know, the doing of this, is expected from Deuines; is commended to them by S. Paul; the example of it is giuen them by the fathers; is profeſſed by the Princes of our ſchoolemen; and, that conſequently, there can not be a greater irrationality, then for a Diuine to ſay there can be no demonſtration in Diuinity. Which were, in effect, to ſtile himſelfe a profeſſour of Diuinity; and att the ſame time to profeſſe there is no ſuch ſcience as Diuinity. For, whatſoeuer is deliuered as Diuinity, and is neither demonſtration, nor the way to it; is, not onely idle garrulity; but profane and temerarious contamination of our holy Chriſtian faith.

But my Lord, I perceiue my weake boate is ſliding apace, before I am

aware, into a ſea too rough and too dangerous for me to ſteere a ſteady courſe in. It is time for me to take in my ſailes, and to lett fall an anchor. I pretend not to learning: much leſſe to be knowing in Diuinity. The various courſes in the world that my ſeuerall employments and fortunes haue caſt me vpon, haue not allowed me time nor meanes to ſtore my minde as I would with knowledge and ſolide litterature. If I haue acquired any thinne ſprinkling in any of the partes of naturall learning, I owe it to my misfortunes, and to the reuolutions of my country cauſing them; that haue condemned me to ſuch a manner of liuing, as if I should not conuerſe with bookes, and employ my time in ſome ſtudy, it would become burthenſome and inſupportable to me. And then, ſince my ſtudy is chiefly for my entertainement; you may eaſily conceiue that my application of it, hath bin vpon ſuch ſub-

iects as I haue beene moſt willing to be informed of. To ſee whither the Immortality of the ſoule may be demonſtrated by reaſon, or no, hath bin a maine one among them: And then, hauing found ſatisfaction therein; and by following of my principles, hauing diſcouered a new world in that region where she liueth, when the body is dead; and meeting there ſuch amazing conſiderations of weale or woe, reſulting out of the guidance of ones life and actions in this world, as would rouſe the ſleepieſt perſon aliue to be very ſolicitous what courſe he taketh here; I do not deny, but that it hath made me more inquiſitiue, then peraduenture, I should otherwiſe haue bin, into what rule and guide may ſecure a man in his iorney thither. For without ſuch liuely ſtirrers vp, it is not vnlikely but that I might haue contented my ſelfe with walking dully and implicitely in the way that my birth and education had

ſett me in. Thus, My lord, I haue gleaned ſo much of Philoſophy, and haue caſt an eye ſo farre into Diuinity, as I haue iudged neceſſary for my owne priuate vſe. In theſe few sheetes, yon haue an eſſay of the litle I know in either. If it may proue as vſefull to you, as I conceiue it hath done to me; I were much too blame, if I did not impart it to you, vnto whom I haue long ſince giuen an equall share and power with my ſelfe, in all that is mine. For beſides your excellent partes in all kindes, (as well the more gentle and the winning ones, as the ſtrong ones) that make you highly eſteemed and honored by all thoſe who know you; your particular kindeneſſe and frendship to me, requireth a particular returne of affection from me. I can not expreſſe it better, then by confidently imparting to you, my priuateſt thoughts; which as they are the pleaſingeſt I euer had; ſo ſeeme they to me, the vſefulleſt. Such

as they are, you haue them here. You will not deny them a welcome, for his ſake, who truly loueth you, and is,

MY LORD,

Your moſt affectionate kynſman, and moſt humble and moſt obedient ſeruant.

THE APPROBATION OF the Doctors of Diuinity of the Faculty of Paris.

THIS ſmall, but learned treatiſe, entitled, *A diſcourſe concerning Infallibility in Religion*; full of ſublime & Chriſtian truths, expreſſed euen beyond the expectation of what humane language could afford; doth clearely shew how Grace is engrafted vpon Nature, that is, how the Diuine & reuealed tenets of our Catholike Church, are framed to heighten, as moſt connaturall to, the light of reaſon; whereby to raiſe our ſoules to a more celeſtiall ſtraine of loue & piety, then euer pure nature could haue attained vnto. To ſay, it containe's nothing, in relation to faith, not Catholique; In reference to manners, not Chriſtian; were to diſcount from the worke's deſert: It being an euident conuiction of

the euer inuiolable & permanent ſubſiſtence of them both in the vniuerſally vnited Roman Church: Demonſtrating withall, the falſe foundations of the Presbyterian conſiſtory, of the Socinian ratiocination, of the Independents priuat Spirit, & of the erroneous, or rather no grounds or principles of the late particular English Proteſtant Schiſmaticall Synagogue. Lett it then bee ſett vpon a candleſticke by publike print, & giue light to all it's readers; that it's bright ſhames may loudly ſpeake it's Authour's vnſpeakeable worth & learning. And wee Doctours of Diuinitie of the Faculty of Paris, by Signing here vnto, neede onely ſay, it needed not our approbation. Paris the 28. Novemb. 1652.

H. HOLDEN.

E. TIREL.

THE Printer entreateth thoſe who ſhall take the paines to reade this diſcourſe, that they will be pleaſed (before they do ſo) to correct ſome errors, in the manner as is intimated hereafter. Others of leſſe importance (as, the miſtake ſometimes of a letter in a word; or the putting two wordes ſo neere together as if they were but one; or ſome failing in Orthography, or ſomme miſſe-pointing) that will not perplexe the ſenſe, to any eaſy reflection; he ſubmitteth to their courteſy to pardon. Which he doubteth not but they will be fauoubly induced to do, when they ſhall conſider that the compoſer and the corrector of the preſſe for this piece, are Strangers to the tongue it is written in: and that they wrought not vpon the originall; but vpon ſuch a coppy, as hauing deſcended by ſeuerall tranſcriptions, and paſſed through ſundry handes, fell in the end

the end caſually into mine: who durſt not aduenture to haue recourſe to the Author for his aſſiſtance herein, leaſt he should haue hindered the publishing (as hitherto he hath done) of what is ſo much deſired and ſought after by all thoſe who haue heard of it.

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